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I. INTRODUCTION

Fair use has historically served as a flexible and adaptable
mechanism for balancing the interests of copyright owners, their
competitors or potential competitors, and the public to fulfill the
larger purposes of copyright law which have traditionally been
understood to be promoting the production and dissemination of
knowledge. 1 Given this history, it is perhaps surprising how little
use has been made, until very recently, of fair use as a defense to
software copyright infringement claims, especially considering the
high volume of such litigations in the past dozen years.2
The most plausible explanation for the dearth of software related
fair-use cases is that the first decade of software litigation concentrated on more fundamental questions, such as whether copyright

1

See, e4g., L Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1
(1987) [hereinafter Patterson, Free Speech] (discussing fair use as a balancing mechanism
for mediating among the interests of authors, publishers, and the public in order to fulfill the
underlying purposes of copyright law).
2
There were a few cases in the first decade of software copyright litigations in which fairuse defenses were raised, although they were not given much attention. See, eg., AllenMyland, Inc. v. International Business Machs., 746 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding
that database of IBM-authored software kept on behalf of IBM customers to whom AMI
provided modification services was not fair use), recons. denied, 770 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Pa.
1991). It may also be that, with the presumption against fair use when defendants have
commercial purposes that the Supreme Court established in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), software copyright defendants have, until
recently, been reluctant to raise fair-use defenses since most of the litigated cases have
involved commercial competitors. See infra note 63 (concerning the Sony presumption of
unfairness when defendants have commercial purposes).
There has also been remarkably little discussion of fair use in the ample law review
literature on copyright protection for computer programs. Two notable exceptions are Leo
J. Raskind, The Uncertain Case For Special Legislation Protecting Computer Software, 47
U. Prrr. L. REv. 1131 (1986) (noting absence of fair-use analysis in computer software
copyright cases) and Stephen K Tapp & Daniel E. Wanat, Computer Software Copyright
Issues: Section 117 and FairUse, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 197 (1992) (taking narrow view
of usefulness of fair use in computer software cases). See also Pamela Samuelson, Modifying
Copyrighted Software: Adjusting Copyright Doctrine to Accommodate a Technology, 28
JuRIdETRIcS J. 179 (1988) [hereinafter Samuelson, Modifying Software] (analyzing adequacy
of current defenses, including fair use, to copyright infringement action); Pamela Samuelson,
Computer Programsand Copyright'sFair Use Doctrine,36 CoMMs. OF THE A.C.M. 19 (Sept.
1993) (evaluating fair use and how the courts have dealt with it in recent decisions).
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protection could be had for all manner of programs3 and what
scope of protection was available to programs from copyright law.4
Although the latter set of issues is still in the process of refinement, there is now more clarity on what aspects of software can be
protected by copyright law and what test should be used to judge
infringement than was true a few years ago.5
This Article aims to explore the potential new terrain for fair-use
defenses in software copyright cases that has opened up in the
aftermath of two Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions, Lewis
Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of America" and Sega Enterprises,Ltd. v.
Accolade, Inc.7 Because of the importance of Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studioss as a precedent not only for the
Ninth Circuit's Galoob and Sega decisions, but also because of its
implications for other potential software copyright disputes, Section
I of this Article will focus on the United States Supreme Court
decisionin Sony. In Sony, a majority of the Court ruled that Sony's
sale of videotape recording machines did not constitute contributory
copyright infringement because of substantial noninfringing uses
that consumers could make of the machines, including use of them
to record programs for viewing at a later time.
At the heart of the contest between the parties in Sony was a
very fundamental difference in conception about the nature of
copyright law. Universal viewed copyright primarily as a propertyrights regime. Sony viewed copyright more as a regulatory regime
in which interests of copyright owners were to be balanced against
the interests of other commercial participants in the marketplace
and of the public at large so as to achieve the larger purposes of
' See, eg., Apple Computer v. Formula Intl, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding
that operating-system programs are protectable by copyright law); NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp.,
10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that microcode is protectable by
copyright law).
' See, eg., Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for
Applications Programs,41 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1989) (discussing the case law).
' In the past year, Computer Associates International v. Altai Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir.
1992) has emerged as the leading case on scope of protection issues and on the appropriate
test for infringement in software copyright cases. See Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,
977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (endorsing Altai); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975
F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (endorsing Altai).
6 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582 (1993).
'977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
6 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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copyright law.'
Universal would have had the Court strictly adhere to the text
of the copyright statute and enforce its property rights under that
statute. Those who used Betamax machines to copy Universal's
movies from broadcast television had violated the exclusive right
granted to copyright owners by the statute to control the reproduction of their works. Because Congress had not adopted a general
private-use exception to this exclusive-rights provision and because
the prior fair-use case law did not support Sony's fair-use claim,
Universal argued that its property rights had to be enforced. 0
Sony, and ultimately a majority of the Supreme Court, conceived
of the dispute very differently. Sony asserted that Congress had
not expressed an intention to give copyright owners exclusive rights
to control the sale of uncopyrightable works, such as its Betamax
machines. This argument drew upon traditional principles of
copyright law harkening back to Baker v. Selden, which caution
courts to be vigilant to ensure that copyright claimants do not use
their copyrights to gain de facto monopolies greater than those
intended by Congress.11 When, as in Sony, new technology
presented an issue that could not be readily answered from the
copyright statute, the regulatory view of copyright would have
courts go back to first principles to determine which result would
best achieve the societal purposes of copyright law.12 Sony is an
important decision because of its endorsement of the regulatory
'See generally Patterson, Free Speech, supra note 1 (contrasting regulatory and property
See also Samuelson, Modifying Software, supra note 2, at 200-04
(interpreting Sony as endorsing regulatory view of copyright). For an interesting if

views of copyright).

ahistorical analysis of copyright as a property rights regime, see Wendy J. Gordon, An
Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and
Encouragement,41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989).
' The dissenting opinion in Sony reflects this view of copyright law. See Sony, 464 U.S.
at 463-75 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
" 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (discussed infra notes 184-187 and accompanying text). See also
Jerome H. Reichnan, Computer ProgramsAs Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of
CopyrightProtectionfor Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L REV. 639, 693-95
n.288 (1989) [hereinafter Reichman, Computer Programs](discussing the historical role of

Baker v. Selden in ensuring that copyright monopoly not be extended to uncopyrightable
material).
' The regulatory conception of copyright for which Sony was arguing "considers the uses
consumers need or want to make of a copyrighted work, balancing their interests against
those of copyright owners. This more flexible, open model of copyright is guided by the
statute, not chained to it.* Samuelson, Modifying Software, supra note 2, at 202-03.
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conception of copyright.1 3
Section II will discuss the implications of Sony for a number of
situations in which private noncommercial copies might be made of

computer programs. There is a very considerable gap between the
view widely held among the consuming public that private
noncommercial copying of any copyrighted work (including
software) is acceptable behavior 14 and that held by software
industry associations such as the Software Publishers Association

(SPA), which seem to regard any unauthorized copying of software
as piracy." As long as the Sony decision remains good law, there
will be room for some fair-use copying of software by consumers,
although less perhaps than some of them might wish."

Section III will review the Sega and Galoob rulings.17 In Galoob
the court ruled that Galoob's product for altering certain aspects of
the play of Nintendo videogames made only fair and noninfringing
uses of Nintendo's works. In Sega, the court ruled that Accolade's

disassembly of Sega programs to determine how to make videogames that would be compatible with the Sega videogame console
made fair use of Sega's copyrighted games. This section will show
the influence of Sony on both the Galoob and Sega rulings. Like

' But see Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (seeming to
reflect a more property-rights approach).
'4 See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 122 (1986) [hereinafter OTA REPORT].
a See, e.g., SOFTWARE PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, WHITE PAPER ON SOFTWARE PIRACY

(1992) [hereinafter SPA WHITE PAPER] (setting forth SPA's views as to what constitutes
software piracy without mention of copyrighr's fair-use defense and discussing its antipiracy
strategies). The SPA actively lobbied for enactment of criminal provisions to make the
copying of ten or more programs over a six month period having a collective value of $2500
or more a felony. The legislation eventually enacted was seemingly broadened to make ten
infringements of any copyrighted work a felony. See Pub. L. No. 102-561, § 1, 106 Stat. 4233
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (1988)). The SPA is now sponsoring advertising campaigns
featuring a picture of a set of handcuffs with the caption, "This is the hardware you can get
for free if you make copies of software." They also maintain a "hotline" so that employees
or household members can report unauthorized copying, based upon which the SPA will have
probable cause to conduct a raid (which they describe as an "audit") to determine whether
and how much unauthorized copying has been done. The felony provisions have substantially aided the SPA's efforts to improve compliance within the business community that accords
with its view of software copyright law.
'6 See infra notes 74-96 and accompanying text.
" Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510; Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of
Am., 964 F.2d 965, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582 (1993).
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Sony before them, they reflect a view of copyright as a regulatory
legal regime.
Section IV will discuss the implications of the Sega decision for
a number of potential disputes between software developers and
their competitors or would-be competitors who seek to gain access
to or make use of functional aspects of programs. Although the
Ninth Circuit in Sega indicated that decompilation or disassembly
of computer programs is not per se lawful, 8 it is nonetheless
consistent with Sega to say that fair use may be available when
decompilation or disassembly is done for other legitimate purposes
apart from obtaining access to interface information. Because Sega
also involved a claim of fair use concerning the reproduction of a
segment of program code necessary to achieve interoperability, it
may open up opportunities for other fair-use defenses when
competitors borrow functional elements of existing programs. This
is not, of course, to say that Sega can be construed as making all
competitive borrowing legal. But fair-use balancing is needed in
the mediation of many kinds of software copyright disputes, and
Sega provides a framework for doing such balancing.
Section V will explore the implications of the Ninth Circuit's
Galoob decision for a number of situations in which users of digital
versions of copyrighted works might raise fair-use defenses if
charged with infringement because they took advantage of the
opportunities that the digital medium and the electronic information tools1 9 now afford them to use those works in ways that have
been unimaginable for works embodied in traditional media such
as print. When enacting the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress
expected that the fair-use defense would evolve over time in
response to challenges posed by new technologies.20 Galoob has
aided this evolution in a manner that balances the legitimate
interests of copyright owners in obtaining a fair return for their

Sega, 977 F.2d at 1518-20.
borrow the term "electronic information tools" from Jerome H. Reichman, Electronic
Information Tools--The OuterEdge of World Intellectual PropertyLaw, 24 1. . C. 446 (1993)
[hereinafter Reichman, ElectronicInformation Tools], conference version published at 17 U.
DAYTON L REv. 797 (1991).
20 See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5678; S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (discussing purpose and provisions
of fair use in Copyright Act of 1976).
191
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contributions to the culture and the public interest in having access
to and the ability to make reasonable use of electronic information
tools.
II. SONY AS A FAIR-USE CASE
Sony is an important precedent for many situations in which fairuse defenses might be asserted in software copyright cases. Private
noncommercial copiers of computer programs would obviously rely
on it. Because of its direction, that when new technologies present
questions for which copyright law has no certain answers the law
should be construed in light of its fundamental purposes, Sony has
significance for many situations in which competitors are seeking
access to functional elements of software or in which users may
make use of digital tools to perform certain kinds of operations on
the contents of copyrighted works.21
A. SOME BACKGROUND ON FAIR USE AND THE SONY CASE

Fair use has never been popular with publishers of copyrighted
works.' This is chiefly because it is often used to limit the scope
of exclusive rights publishers would enjoy if fair use did not
exist.23 Courts have often relied upon fair use to resolve disputes
when recognition of broad rights in publishers or authors would

"' It is a fair observation that, to some extent, Sony cuts both ways because of its dicta
concerning a presumption against fair use when a subsequent user has a commercial
purpose. See supra note 2. Software copyright defendants have tended to be commercial
competitors.
' Publishers have recently had some significant victories against copiers who had
thought their conduct would be shielded by fair use on account of the educational or research
purposes being served by the copying. See, eg., Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp.,
758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp.
1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). See also Jane C. Ginsburg, ReproductionofProtected Works for University
Research or Teaching,39 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 181 (1992) (addressing problems and potential
solutions posed by reproduction for university teaching and research purposes).
" In the Continental European authors' rights tradition, there is no such thing as a "fair
use" defense to an infringement action because of the firmer hold natural-rights (i.e., a
property-oriented) theory has in this tradition as contrasted with the more utilitarian
tradition of American law. There is, however, a right of "fair quotation" in the Continental
tradition. See, e.g., SAM RiCKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTISTIc WORKS: 1886-1986, at 489 (1987).
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have frustrated achievement of the societal purposes of copyright
law.' In the American tradition, the ultimate purpose of copyright is not the maximization of financial rewards to copyright
owners (which is what publishers would generally like it to be), but
fostering the creation and dissemination of literary and artistic
works in order to enhance the public's access to knowledge.' The
grant of exclusive rights to authors enabling them to reap a portion
of the value derived from their creative contributions is a means to
this larger end.
The copyright statute directs consideration of four factors when
fair use is asserted as a defense to a claim of copyright infringement.' Although courts often consider only these four factors in
ruling on fair-use defenses, the text of section 107 indicates an
openness to consideration of other factors," which would seem to
include the fairness of the defendant's conduct.'
The first statutory fair-use factor is the purpose and character of
the copier's use of the copyrighted work. The preamble to the fairuse provision gives examples of kinds of uses that are contemplated
as potentially fair. These include "criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship or research."' The text of the
first factor provision also makes clear that "whether [the] use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes" is
also important.'
The second fair-use factor focuses on the nature of the copyrighted work. It is somewhat difficult to state concisely the principle

" See, eg., Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding
fair use for reproductions of frames from film of Kennedy assassination in book on theory
about it).
2 See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
(proclaiming that the "ultimate aim" of U.S. copyright law is to stimulate artistic creativity
for the general public good).
2 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). For an excellent discussion of these four factors and the
advantage they potentially offer over the more generalized fair-use doctrine that existed
before enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, see Jay Dratler, Jr., Distilling The Witches'
Brew of FairUse in Copyright Law, 43 U. MIAMI L REV. 233 (1988).
27 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) (indicating nonexclusivity of factors). See, e.g., Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Fair'sFair:A Comment On The FairUse Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1149
(1990) (discussing consideration of nonstatutory factors).
Weinreb, supra note 27, at 1138.
2 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
3 Id.
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underlying this factor. One can, however, say that, in general, the
scope of fair use tends to be somewhat broader if the work is of a
factual or functional nature than if it is artistic or fanciful. 31
Whether the work is published or unpublished, or in or out of print,
is also typically considered in the analysis of the nature-of-the-work
factor.32 Although this factor is often ignored or underemphasized
in fair-use cases," in some cases it plays a crucial role.'
The third fair-use factor considers the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the work as a whole. Substantiality is judged not only quantitatively but qualitatively as well. A
quantitatively small amount of copying may be qualitatively
substantial.' Even so, it is generally true that the more a second
comer takes, the less likely fair use is to be found.
The fourth factor considers the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or the value of the copyrighted work.
Although from reading the text of the fair-use provision, one might
get the impression that the purpose of the use was the most
important of the fair-use factors, the courts often seem
to regard
3
6
outcome-determinative.
most
the
as
factor
"harm"
the
The principal charge against Sony in the lawsuit brought by
Universal City Studios and Walt Disney Productions was that of
contributory copyright infringement.37 Universal claimed that
Sony had sold Betamax machines knowing that its customers would
use the machines to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted

SI

See, eg., Dratler, supra note 26, at 303 (nature of work has impact on work's

protection).
32 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 553 (1985)
(unpublished status of work is an important factor in rejection of fair-use defense).

' See, e4g., Dratler, supra note 26, at 262-85 (complaining about failure of Court to
address nature-of-the-work factor in Sony and about Court's analysis of factor in Harper&
Row).
" See, e4g., Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussed
infra notes 121-143 and accompanying text).
" See, eg., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565 (taking "heart of book" is qualitatively

substantial although quantitatively small).
'6 Id. at 566. Yet, it is also true that courts inclined to regard a use as fair will
sometimes understate the potential for harm to markets, see, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 452-54 (1984), while those inclined to regard the use
as unfair will sometimes overstate the potential for harm, see, e.g., Salinger v. Random
House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
37 Sony, 464 U.S. at 417.
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television programs,' including those of Universal and Disney
movies and other programs produced by these firms.3 ' This
copying, Universal asserted, infringed its copyrights. Some of
Sony's ads for the Betamax machine exhorted prospective customers to buy a Betamax machine to copy their favorite programs.40
Only when customers got home and opened the box to take out
their new purchase would they find a cautionary note about
possible copyright infringements.41
Because there must be an underlying infringement before
someone can be found liable for contributory infringement,
Universal identified consumers who used the Betamax machine to
copy programs off-the-air as the underlying infringers. To aid in
the assessment of this claim, a representative owner of a Betamax
machine who used his machine for time-shifting and for librarying

s' Unlike the federal patent and trademark statutes, the copyright statute does not have
a contributory infringement provision. Sony, 464 U.S. at 434-35. Although courts had
previously recognized the existence of contributory copyright infringement, see, e.g., Kalem
Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911), Universal's argument against recognition of any
private-use privilege under the Copyright Act of 1976 relied heavily on the argument that
Congress had put every copyright rule it intended for courts to use in the text of the 1976
Act. Yet, there was no mention of contributing infringement in the 1976 Act, although
contributory infringement provisions exist in the federal patent and trademark statutes.
Thus, a problem Universal may have had in persuading a majority of the Court to the strict
statutory approach it wanted the Court to take in interpretation of the exclusive rights and
fair-use provisions, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 107 (1988), was that if the Court had taken a very
strict statutory approach to analyzing the claims in the case, Universal might have lost
because of the failure of Congress to include a contributory infringement provision in the
statute. Once the Court looked beyond the statute to find a standard for contributory
infringement, a majority of the members of the Court seemed willing to take a broader view
of fair use as well. See Samuelson, Modifying Software, supra note 2, at 202-04.
There was also a direct infringement claim against Sony and some retail establishments
that sold Betamax machines which used them to make copies of programs to test or
illustrate use of the machine. There were also several other state and federal law claims in
the case. See Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 432 (C.D. Cal.
1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
'Universal argued that the contributory infringement standard from certain trademark
cases (i.e., providing the instrumentality for infringement with constructive knowledge it will
be used to infringe) should be adopted for judging contributory copyright infringement. The
Supreme Court majority questioned whether this was the proper contributory infringement
standard for trademark law, but went on to give reasons for rejecting the adoption of a
trademark standard in copyright cases. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19.
'0 Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 436.
41 Id.
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purposes was added as a defendant in the lawsuit. 42 It was in
this odd way that the issue of whether private noncommercial
copying of copyrighted works infringed copyrights in these works
was first brought to the United States Supreme Court.
Ordinarily, private noncommercial copiers are virtually immune
from copyright infringement suits. This is partly because private
copying is generally difficult for copyright owners to detect. Even
when private-use copying can be detected, copyright owners are
likely to decide that it is not worth the expense of litigation or
potential bad publicity to reach individual private copiers. Nevertheless, publishers have long regarded private-use copying as
infringement, notwithstanding their awareness that the public
tends to regard noncommercial copying as noninfringing. Consequently, Sony was widely regarded as an important test case on
this issue.4'
Sony's main defense to the contributory infringement claim relied
on the fact that there were many noninfringing uses of its Betamax
machines, the most substantial of which was to make copies of
programs for time-shifting purposes, a use which Sony argued was
fair and noninfringing. Sony argued that the Court should borrow
the "staple item of commerce" doctrine from patent law" and
relieve Sony of the contributory infringement charges because of
the substantial noninfringing uses of the Betamax machine.'
Because Universal's arguments for infringement in the Sony case
" Universal stipulated that no damages or other relief would be sought against him. Id.
at 436-37.
SSee, eg., Melville B. Nimmer, Copyright Liability for Audio Home Recording:
Dispelling the Betamax Myth, 68 VA. L. REV. 1505 (1982) (regarding Sony decision as
containing most detailed analysis of legal status of noncommercial copying).
" See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1988). Congress has decided that sale of devices that have
substantial noninfringing uses should not give rise to contributory patent infringement
because of the undue interference with competition in commerce for unpatented items that
would be brought about. If, however, a device has no significant use except to permit
purchasers to infringe a patent, sale of that device can be prohibited as a contributory patent
infringement. See generally Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980)
(providing history of doctrines of contributory infringement and patent misuse).
a Sony also argued that Congress had intended for private noncommercial taping to be
noninfringing and hence that there was an implied exemption for such copying in the
Copyright Act of 1976. See Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429,
442-46 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). The
Supreme Court majority does not discuss this issue. But see Sony, 464 U.S. at 463-75
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) for a response to the implied exemption argument.
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parallel the kinds of arguments that software publishers would
likely make in any case involving private-use copying of computer
programs, a brief review of those arguments is in order.
B. UNIVERSAL'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST FAIR USE

Universal asserted that the those who copied its programs offthe-air with a Betamax machine were making intrinsic rather than
productive uses of the copyrighted works." Productive uses bring
a new work, such as a critical review that quotes from a copyrighted novel, into the world, thereby adding to the corpus of knowledge,
which furthers the ultimate purpose of copyright law. An intrinsic
use merely consumes the work in the same way as if a copy had
been purchased. Universal pointed to the preamble of the fair-use
provision of the copyright statute which gives many examples of
productive uses as favored uses, by which Congress had expressed
its intention that productive uses, not intrinsic or consumptive
ones, should qualify as fair use.
Universal argued that the second fair-use factor also weighed
heavily against a finding of fair use. The works about which
Universal and Disney were concerned were fanciful entertainments.
Many copyright cases have regarded works of entertainment as
having a narrow scope of fair use,' and if this principle had been
applied in Sony, it would have certainly weighed against a finding
of fair use.
The factor that seemed most likely to doom Sony's fair-use
defense was the third fair-use factor, which concerns the substantiality of the taking. Those who used Betamax machines to copy
television broadcasts tended to copy the whole work. Universal
made much of the fact that fair use had never previously been
found when the whole of a copyrighted work had been copied."9
This certainly had to count against a finding of fair use.
I The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in Sony gave substantial weight to this
factor. See Sony, 659 F.2d at 970-72.
'7 See Dratler, supra note 26, at 289-91(insisting that productive uses were intended by
Congress to be favored).
See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
The Ninth Circuit opinion in Sony was heavily influenced by this argument. See Sony,
659 F.2d at 973.
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Although conceding that it had as yet suffered no identifiable
harm to the market for its movies from this copying,5° Universal
noted that harm to the market is often difficult to show in copyright cases. Universal offered both evidence and theories as to a
number of potential harms to its future markets from Betamax
copying." Universal noted that courts have often presumed harm
from the mere fact of copying, in order to be solicitous of copyright
owners' need to maintain exclusivity to protect potential markets
from future harms.52
Universal reasoned that copyright owners had been given the
exclusive right to reproduce their works in copies, that users of the
Betamax machine were making unauthorized copies of copyrighted
movies, and that neither the fair-use defense nor any of the other
special privilege provisions of the copyright law immunized privateuse copying. Had Congress meant to privilege private-use copying,
Universal argued, it would have explicitly said so.'
C. THE SUPREME COURT'S FAIR-USE ANALYSIS IN SONY

In an opinion atypical of the copyright case law on fair use, a
majority of the Supreme Court rejected nearly every argument
made by Universal in the Sony case. Although this opinion has
been much criticized by copyright scholars,"' I regard it as con' See Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 439-40 (C.D. Cal.
1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), reu'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding that copyright
holders of audiovisual materials did not have the right to control off-the-air copying by video
tape recorder owners in their homes for private, noncommercial use).
61 The District Court opinion in Sony discusses these potential harms at some length.
See Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 438-42, 450-52.
This argument persuaded the Ninth Circuit. See Sony, 659 F.2d at 973-74.
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Sony expresses this view. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 461-75.
See also Nimmer, supra note 43.
SSee, eg., Dratler, supra note 26; William Fisher, Reconstructingthe FairUse Doctrine,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1659 (1988). Even scholars who agreed with the outcome were critical,
see, e.g., Weinreb, supra note 27, at 1154-56 (characterizing Court's fair-use analysis in Sony
as "hopelessly inadequate" and as a "procrustean effort to make the correct result fit that
analysis rather than stating its real basis directly"). The critics are correct that the Court
in Sony should have elaborated more about the second and third fair-use factors, and that
its dicta creating a presumption of unfairness from commercial purposes has had unfortunate
consequences in subsequent case law. I nonetheless regard the court's decision to look
beyond the narrow confines of the fair-use factors to consider the larger implications of its
decision as a sound one.
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taining considerable wisdom about the role of copyright as a
regulator of the competing interests of copyright owners, other
commercial providers, and the general public. Taking a regulatory
approach to resolving a hotly contested case involving a new
technology issue is particularly appropriate when copyright
claimants make unprecedented claims about the reach of their
rights, as they did in Sony. The majority opinion in Sony is a
critically important precedent for what I regard as the correct
decisions in two other new technology cases, namely the Sega and
Galoob decisions discussed in Section III.5
Sony was atypical of fair-use case law in part because the Court
viewed the dispute in a broader context than the statutory fair-use
factors would have dictated.' The Court observed, for example,
that to grant relief to Universal would interfere not only with
Sony's ability to sell Betamax machines, but also with the public's
ability to have access to this desirable new technology as well as
with the interests of the many copyright owners who either
welcomed or did not mind the copying of their programs off-the-air
by owners of Betamax machines."7 It would be equivalent to
interpreting the statute as giving Universal the exclusive right to
control the sale of Betamax machines." The Court decided this
went further than the statute provided or than Congress had
intended.59
uSega Enters., Ltd., v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Lewis Galoob Toys
v. Nintendo of Am., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582 (1993). See
infra notes 97-143 and accompanying text.
" The majority opinion did not even begin to discuss fair-use issues until Section IV-B
of the opinion. Much of the important analysis in the case is to be found in Sections II and
III which discussed the nature of copyright law and the contributory infringement doctrine.
As noted above, supra note 27 and accompanying text, the text of the fair-use provision
indicates that other factors besides the four named factors can be considered in judging
whether a fair use has been made of the copyrighted work.
'7 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442-46.
"It seems extraordinary to suggest that the Copyright Act confers upon all copyright
owners collectively, much less the two respondents in this case, the exclusive right to
distribute VTRs (video tape recorders] simply because they can be used to infringe
copyrights.' Id. at 441 n.21.
"'The
Court of Appeals' holding that respondents are entitled to enjoin the distribution
of VTRs, to collect royalties on the sale of such equipment or to obtain other relief, if
affirmed, would enlarge the scope of respondents' statutory monopolies to encompass an
article of commerce that is not the subject of copyright protection. Such an expansion of the
copyright privilege is beyond the limits of the grants authorized by Congress.* Id. at 421.
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The Court was impressed by the many noninfringing uses that
could be made of Betamax machines.' ° Betamax machines could
be used for such things as showing homemade movies. They could
also be used to copy programs from broadcast television that were
uncopyrighted. In addition, they could be used to copy programs
whose copyright owners did not object to off-the-air copying by
owners of Betamax machines. The most substantial use of the
Betamax machine, however, was to copy programs for later viewing
when owners were unable to watch a program at the time it was
scheduled for broadcast. 61 This practice was known as timeshifting. Sony argued that this practice was also noninfringing
under the fair-use doctrine.
In analyzing whether home copying of programs off-the-air for
time-shifting purposes was fair or unfair, the Court began with the
observation that the purpose of a Betamax owner's copying of
programs off-the-air was private and noncommercial.62 The Court
decided that courts should presume private noncommercial copying
to be fair.' Only if there was some demonstrable likelihood of
harm to the market for the copyrighted work from private noncom-

In this and other passages, eg., id. at 429, there is an antitrust-like flavor to the Court's
analysis of congressional purposes for copyright. But Sony was far from the first decision
to have regard for the competitive consequences of its ruling. Concerns that copyright law
not be interpreted to give patent-like protection date back to cases such as Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99 (1879), discussed infra notes 184-187 and accompanying text.
' In explaining its reasons for importing the "staple item of commerce" doctrine of patent
law into copyright jurisprudence, the Court spoke of the "historic kinship" between patent
and copyright law, Sony 464 U.S. at 439, and public-policy concerns that had historically
been recognized in beth bodies of law about efforts by holders of these rights to extend the
monopolies beyond that which Congress had intended. Id. at 441-42.
61
Id. at 423.
2 Id. at 449.
Id. The Sony decision has been much criticized for its unprecedented creation of a
presumption of fairness when private noncommercial activity was involved and of unfairness
for defendants with commercial purposes. See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 26; Weinreb, supra
note 27. As Dratler notes, neither presumption was necessary to resolve the issues in the
case. Id. at 263-64. Of the two presumptions, the one that presumes unfairness from
commercial purposes has proved the most troublesome in subsequent case law. See, e.g.,
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992) (reversing District Court
finding of fair use primarily because District Court had treated commercial nature of 2 Live
Crew's parody of "Pretty Woman" as cutting against fair use, instead of following Sony's
presumption of unfairness), cert.granted in part, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993). 1 am among those
who hope that the Supreme Court will use the opportunity this case presents to eliminate
the presumption against unfairness when the defendant has some commercial purpose.
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mercial copying should the presumption of fairness be overcome."
Concerning the second fair-use factor, the Court seemed to think
it too did not disfavor fair use because Universal had chosen to
have its copyrighted movies shown on broadcast television."
Universal had, of course, been handsomely compensated for doing
so and had known that viewers would get to see the programs "for
free." The fees which Universal could command for television
broadcasts of its movies depended on having large audiences.
Time-shifting simply allowed those who wanted to view a movie
broadcast between nine and eleven p.m. to see it at another time
when circumstances conspired to make contemporaneous viewing
impossible."
Time-shifters typically copied the whole of a broadcasted movie,
and ordinarily this would strongly disfavor a finding of fair use. 7

A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof
either that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the
copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be shown; such a
requirement would leave the copyright holder with no defense against
predictable damage. Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that
future harm will result. What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.
If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be
presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must
be demonstrated.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. The Court regarded a prohibition on private noncommercial uses
having no demonstrable effect on the market for the work as "merely inhibit[ing] access to
ideas without any countervailing benefit.' Id. at 450-51.
" Id. at 449. As other scholars have noted, the Sony decision does not contain an
extensive analysis of the second fair-use factor. See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 26, at 264
(insisting that Court ignored second factor altogether). The Court was surely too cryptic
about the nature-of-the-work factor, but it does mention "the nature of a televised
copyrighted audiovisual work... (which enables a viewer to see such a work] which he had
been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge..... " See Sony, 464 U.S. at 449. The
District Court opinion had given more extensive analysis of broadcasting as part of its
discussion of the nature of the work factor. See 480 F. Supp. at 452-53. The points
elaborated in the text following this note are the essential points made in the District Court
opinion which I infer the Court meant to adopt as its own.
" Id. at 449-50.
6 Id. at 450. All that the Court said about the substantiality issue was that although the
copying of the whole work would ordinarily militate against fair use, other factors (chiefly
the fact that time-shifting merely lets viewers see at a later time that which they could have
watched without charge at the scheduled time) caused copying the whole of the work not to
have its ordinary effect.
"
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But the time-shifted copy itself was ephemeral. " Once the timeshifted program had been viewed, owners of Betamax machines
typically taped over the program the next time they wanted to
make a time-shifted copy of another program.
Concerning the harm factor, the Court observed that Universal
and Disney admitted that no harm to the market had yet occurred.' Although they offered evidence about the potential for
future harms to their markets,7" the Court accepted the District
Court's characterization of this evidence as quite speculative. 7 '
Speculation of this sort was not enough, the Court decided, to
overcome the presumption of fairness that arose from the private
noncommercial purpose of the copying.
The Court saw nothing in the Copyright Act to indicate "that the
elected representatives of the millions of people who watch
television every day have made it unlawful to copy a program for
later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat prohibition against
the sale of machines that make such copying possible."7 2 Perhaps
Congress would "take a fresh look at this new technology" and
decide to regulate it, but seeing no sign that Congress had chosen
to regulate it yet, and given the substantial noninfringing uses of
the Betamax machine, the Court concluded that Sony should not be
held liable for contributory infringement.7

The Court mentions the ephemeral character of time-shifted copies as part of its
assessment of the harm factor. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 453 n.39 (stating that temporary
recording for time-shifting purposes will not harm public interest in theatrical exhibitions).
*Id. at 452.
0
1d.
I at 452-54. Universal made several arguments about potential harm: that timeshifting would reduce the size of live audiences on which Nielsen ratings tend to be based,
that it would reduce the demand for television rebroadcasts of movies, and that it would
reduce the likelihood that people would go out to see a movie because they had seen a timeshifted copy of it.
1
I at 454.
1d.
Id. at 456. The trial court in Sony also noted that the legislative history of the
Copyright Act of 1976 indicated that Congress intended that the fair-use doctrine should
evolve to deal with new technology issues. Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 456.
' For a discussion of alternative grounds for the Sony decision, see, e.g., Weinreb, supra
note 27, at 1155-58 (arguing that Sony was correct because uses challenged in case were
widely regarded as fair) and Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure: A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors,82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600
(making an economic argument for finding fair use in Sony).
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III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SONY FOR PRIVATE NONCOMMERCIAL
COPYING OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS

While it is easy to question the estimates made by industry
associations as to the extent of unauthorized copying of software or
of revenues lost thereby,74 no one doubts that a considerable
amount of unauthorized copying exists. The SPA seems to regard
every unauthorized copy of a computer program as an infringing
copy."' Members of the general public disagree and act as though
fair use broadly privileges private and noncommercial copying of
programs.7 Considered below are some examples of situations as
to which many consumers would argue that fair use should be
found.
A. A COPY AT THE OFFICE, A COPY AT HOME

It is a common practice for people to purchase one copy of a
program, such as a word-processing package, and load it onto a
computer at home as well as onto an office computer. One can
hardly blame software publishers for preferring that their customers buy two copies of the software instead of just one, but that does
not necessarily mean the second copy is an infringing copy.
The arguments that the SPA would make, if litigating a case of
this sort, would parallel the argument that Universal made in
Sony. The first factor would disfavor a finding of fair use, in their
view, because it would be a nonproductive, intrinsically consumptive use. The SPA would also argue that the nature-of-the-work
factor would disfavor fair use. Software, they would argue, is an
unpublished work by virtue of "shrink-wrap license agreements,"
which typically contain many restrictions on uses that may be
made of programs and which assert that consumers are not owners

"' Estimates of the number of unauthorized copies tend to be unreliable because no one
really knows the extent of private-use copying done by individuals. Estimates of lost
revenues are unreliable because they tend to be based on these unreliable estimates about
the number of private-use copies made and because they also assume that each copy
displaces a sale. See, e.g., OTA REPORT, supra note 14, at 197-204.
7
See, e.g., SPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 15.
76
See, e.g., OTA REPORT, supra note 14, at 209.
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of copies of the programs contained on the purchased disk.7 7 The
amount copied would be the whole work, which always cuts against
a finding of fair use. The copy would also displace a second sale of
the software, in the SPA's view. Furthermore, "shrink-wrap
agreements" routinely inform consumers that they are only entitled
to load the software onto one computer.
A consumer-oriented analysis might begin with a characterization
of the copying as a private noncommercial act which under Sony is
presumptively fair."' The nature of the work could also be argued
to favor fair use, because software is an odd sort of product.79
Unlike a book which one can readily carry back and forth between
one's office and home so that one need not buy two copies to have
one at each place, it is simply infeasible to expect someone to
transport software in a similar way. As a practical matter, it
makes no sense to load the software onto one's office computer hard
disk in the morning, erase it before going home that night in order
to take a copy of it home so that one can load it onto the home
computer that evening, and delete it from the home computer the
next morning so that it can be taken back to the office computer.
Yet these acts would be equivalent to taking a book back and forth
from home to office. As for the shrink-wrap license restrictions,
they are often unavailable to be read until after the software is
purchased and are of questionable enforceability. Moreover, courts
have recently rejected arguments that mass-marketed software is
an unpublished work.'
It would, of course, cut against a finding of fair use that one
would be copying the whole of the copyrighted program, but the
Sony case shows that this is not necessarily dispositive. Concerning the harm factor, one might argue that this kind of copying is
expected by many software developers and is largely unobjection"See, eg., Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBS.,
Spring 1992, at 185, 194-201 (discussing this and related theories).
78
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
7 See, e.g., Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524-26 (9th Cir. 1992)
(discussing respects in which software is unusual subject matter for copyright protection as

part of fair-use analysis of nature-of-the-work factor).
0

For reasons supporting this objection, see, e.g., Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of Am.

964 F.2d 965, 970-71 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting Nintendo's assertion that its computer game
cartridge was unpublished work), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582 (1993); Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526
n.9 (citing Galoob); and Litman, supra note 77.
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able (although developers might not necessarily want to admit this
in public), especially if no more than one copy of the software is
being used at any one time."1 Furthermore, it is not necessarily
true that if unable to make a second copy of the program for one's
second computer, one would buy a second copy of the program.
Given the high costs of many software packages, consumers might
be more likely to work longer hours at the office and use the home
computer for games or otherwise avoid a second purchase. One
might also argue that the home copy can be regarded as a backup
copy of the program while one is at the office, which can be justified
either under the fair-use doctrine or under the special software
backup provision of the copyright law.82
B. MAKING A COPY TO TEST THE FUNCTIONALITY OF A PROGRAM

An even stronger argument for fair use could be made if one
made a copy of a program to test its functionality, that is, to see if
it will really do what one needs it to do. Someone may borrow a
copy of a program from a friend to test it for a couple of hours and
may be so happy with it that he buys a copy of the program the
next morning (or deletes the copy after the test reveals that the
hype on the package was just that). 3
The SPA can be expected to view this unauthorized copying as
infringing. It too involves making a copy of the whole of the
program for an intrinsic purpose in violation of the shrink-wrap
restriction. The SPA might liken a defense of such copying to the
strained argument that might be made by someone who stole a

" Borland International sells software with a shrink-wrap license expressing this view.
See, eg., Weinreb, supra note 27, at 1158 (suggesting that widespread perception that use
is fair should carry weight in fair-use analysis).
8

17 U.S.C. § 117 (1980 & Supp. 1993).

It is interesting to observe that efforts by

software developers to "copy-protect" their products, through the distribution of object code

containing segments of code which prevented duplication of the product, were so unpopular
with consumers that market factors caused developers to abandon this strategy.
" Some software developers make their products available as "shareware" and explicitly
authorize making a copy of a program to test it out on the expectation that if the user likes
the software, he or she will send money to the developer. Some major commercial producers
of software sometimes make promotional copies of some software available for periods of time

sufficient to test it out or offer demo disks to allow consumers to test out some part of the
functionality of the product before buying it.
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candy bar that his taking of it was not theft because he later left
money on the counter of the store from which it was taken. 4 The
harm comes from the unauthorized appropriation, in the SPA's
view.
One might counter that software is the kind of product that one
cannot really inspect before one buys it in the way one can, for
example, browse a book before purchasing it. The copy made to
test the program's functionality would be as ephemeral as the timeshifted copy in Sony. Further, by either purchasing a copy of the
program thereafter or destroying the test copy, one would not be
harming the market or potential market for the copyrighted
work.'
C. LENDING A COPY TO A FRIEND

Another common kind of private noncommercial copying of
software arises from lending a disk to a friend who thereafter
makes a copy from the disk. The SPA could be expected to argue
that not only is the friend who makes a copy from the lent disk an
infringer of the software copyright, but the one who did the lending
can be reached as a contributory infringer, for he or she must have
known of the significant likelihood that the friend would make a
copy of the program. Some copyright scholars, most notably
Professor Patterson, might argue that no infringement should be
found in this kind of case, a result consistent with the views of the
general public.
Before discussing how this kind of copying might be treated
under the Sony decision, it is worth pointing out that a number of
countries have explicit private-use privileges in their copyright
" The Court in Sony rejected as oversimplistic an argument that private noncommercial
copying ofcopyrighted works was akin to arguing that taking a valuable item ofjewelry from
a store was not theft because the wearer only intended to make use of it in his or her home.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 450 n.3 (1984).
8 Other examples of private-use copying likely to be viewed as fair under Sony would
include making a copy of a program for use on a backup computer if the primary computer
is being repaired and loading a copy onto another computer if necessary to give one access
to a program finctionality that one has paid for but which one's usual computer does not
allow one to exploit (e.g., loading a word processing program onto a computer used
exclusively for printing documents when the computer on which words are processed has no
printing facility). Other examples are discussed infra in Section IV.
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laws.'
United States copyright law has no general private-use privilege,
although as Sony indicates, private-use copying can be dealt with
under the fair-use doctrine. Professor Patterson has pointed out
that American copyright law has principally been concerned with
controlling the behavior of commercial competitors who would, in
the absence of copyright, make and distribute multiple copies of the
whole or substantial portions of a first author's work. 7 Because
commercial competitors of this sort make unfair use of the copyright in the first work, they routinely are and should be found
liable for copyright infringement.
Patterson points out that the fair-use doctrine arose from, and is
principally invoked in, cases in which a second author incorporates
a portion of the first work into a subsequent work.' Even though
the publisher of the second work may make some use of the first
work's copyright by its commercial reproduction of portions of the
first work in its multiple copies of the second work, the second
publisher's use of the first author's copyright may nonetheless be
a noninfringing fair use. 9 Patterson distinguishes this kind of
fair use of a first author's copyright interests from the kinds of
private and noncommercial uses that a consumer might make of his
copy of the work. Even if a consumer's ordinary use of his or her
copy of a work involves copying it for personal use,.' Patterson
regards such copying as noninfringing because it does not involve
See PAUL GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW (1992) (discussing, among others,
the French private-use privilege at FRA-116-119, the Italian personal-use privilege at ITA68.1-69, and the Japanese private-use privilege, at JAP-52-53). See also RICKETSON, supra
note 23, at 479-87. Ricketson does not believe that other nations' private-use privileges
would cover the kind of private-use copying discussed in the text. See id. at 486.
87 See Patterson, Free Speech, supra note 1, at 37. See also L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY
W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS 12-14 (1991)
(distinguishing among the author's interest in his or her "work" which may be represented
by the manuscript, the "copyright" interest arising from creation of the work, rights which
are often assigned to a publisher for its use in making and distributing multiple copies of the
work, and the consumer's interest in a physical object embodying the work, that is, in his or
her "copy" of it).
See Patterson, Free Speech, supra note 1, at 37-40.
"An example of a fair noninfringing use of the copyright would be quoting a portion of
the first work when necessary to understanding some point made in the second work.
" See Patterson, Free Speech, supra note 1, at 37-48. The "one copy in the office, one copy
at home" is an example of the kind of ordinary uses of a copy of a copyrighted work that
Patterson regards as acceptable. Id.
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use of the author's copyright, but only use of the consumer's own
copy of the work.91
While Patterson makes a forceful historical argument for the
proposition that private noncommercial copying should be regarded
as noninfringing as an ordinary use of a consumer's copy of the
work,' it is fair to say that the Sony majority opinion did not go
that far. The Court in Sony did, of course, create a presumption in
favor of fair use when the copying was for private noncommercial
purposes, but it did not rule that all private noncommercial copying
should be regarded as a fair use.
Had the Court gone on to rule that copying movies off-the-air for
librarying purposes was noninfringing, one could have made a
reasonably persuasive argument that, under Sony, making a
private noncommercial copy of a piece of software from a friend's
copy should also be regarded as fair use. 3 But given that the
Court was deeply split over fair use even as to copying for timeshifting purposes-only five members favored finding fair use in
the case and four opposed it-there is reason to doubt that the
Court would have regarded copying for librarying purposes as a fair
use.
Librarying would certainly have changed the fair-use calculus as
to the third and fourth factors. A reason that the Court seems to
have decided that home copying of a movie off-the-air with a
Betamax machine was fair use was that the copy was ephemeral.
A libraried copy of a movie would have a more permanent character, as would the copy of software made from a friend's disk.
Although at the time Sony was decided there was not a substantial

" Although private noncommercial copying is sometimes discussed under the rubric of
fair use, as it seems to have been in Sony, Patterson regards this as a corruption of the fairuse doctrine. Id. at 40.
9

Id.

at 13-36. See also L. Ray Patterson, UnderstandingFair Use, LAW & CONTEMP.

PROBS., Spring 1992, at 249, 250-60 (discussing origins and current status of fair use and
right to copy).
Even this would not be an easy argument. Sony could arguably be distinguished as
a case in which a copy was made of a program broadcast "for free" on television, a form of
distribution which is not typical for software, except among those who distribute their
programs as "shareware." Software developers are also more dependent on the sale of copies
to individuals for their revenues than are movie producers whose most substantial revenues
derive from exhibitions in theaters and for whom sales of individual copies to consumers
tends to represent a small (although perhaps growing) proportion of income.
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market in videocassettes, such a market exists today.9
A
libraried copy of a movie made off-the-air today might displace the
sale of a videocassette. However, one can still argue, with respect
to a VCR copy of a movie and with respect to a copy of software
made by a friend, that one should not blindly assume that every
private-use copy displaces a sale or harms the market for the
copyrighted work." However, the Sony majority conceived of the
possibility that private noncommercial copying could have a
demonstrable effect on the market for a copyrighted work. When
it did, the Court seemed inclined to regard the presumption of
fairness arising from the private noncommercial purpose as likely
to be overcome."
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF FAIR USE IN THE SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT
CASE LAW: GALOOB V. NINTENDO AND SEGA V. ACCOLADE

Two recent software copyright cases have given serious and
favorable attention to fair-use defenses. 7 They are Lewis Galoob
Toys v. Nintendo of America9 and Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v.
"Dratler suggests that the Sony majority opinion underestimated the potential harm to
Universal's market because unrestrained home copying impacted the videocassette market
that developed after Sony. Dratler, supra note 26, at 280. Dratler does not seem to have
thought about the possibility that the Sony decision may, in fact, have contributed to the
growth of the videocassette market. Having been unable to persuade the Court to stop the
sale of videotape machines, Universal and other producers of copyrighted movies had
economic incentives to cash in on the extraordinary market opportunities that had come to
exist by virtue of the installed base of these machines in consumers' homes by releasing
cassettes of their movies for direct sale to consumers and for sale to the burgeoning video
rental outlet market.
' See 8upra note 83. The friend who makes a copy from a lent disk may well decide to
buy a copy of the software later in order to have the user manual, have the benefit of
services offered by the developer, get upgrades, or pay the developer for the benefit he or she
has received when he or she has the resources to do so. If the friend does not later purchase
a copy, it is difficult under Sony to argue that this kind of private copying is fair use.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 450-51 (1984). Copyright
lawyers today are unlikely to advise clients that private noncommercial copying of
copyrighted works is lawful. But it is worth noting that few of them would have predicted
that Sony would win against Universal in the Sony case either.
" For reference to a few other software cases in which the courts have not taken fair-use
defenses seriously, see supra note 2.
,"780 F. Supp. 1283 (N.D. Cal. 1991), affd, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1582 (1993).
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Accolade Software, Inc." Both were decided by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Both rely heavily, although by no means
exclusively, on the Sony decision, and both reflect a more regulatory than proprietary approach to copyright. Sega, in particular,
exhibits concerns, as did Sony, about interpretations of copyright
that would extend the copyright monopoly beyond the bounds
intended by Congress.
A. GALOOB V. NINTENDO

Nintendo charged Lewis Galoob Toys with contributory copyright
infringement because Galoob's Game Genie was designed to alter
certain aspects of the play of Nintendo videogames.' ° When
attached to cartridges in a Nintendo Entertainment System, the
Game Genie could be programmed to do such things as increase the
number of lives of a particular videogame character.1"' The
Game Genie accomplished these changes by intercepting certain
signals from the Nintendo program and substituting other signals
in the place of the Nintendo signals.'0 2 Nintendo's theory was
that Galoob provided consumers with a device knowing that the
consumers would use it to alter the audiovisual sequences of the

' 785 F. Supp. 1392, affd in part,rev'd in part, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). See also
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (anticipating the Ninth
Circuit's Sega decision).
100Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of Am., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1582 (1993). Nintendo also claimed direct infringement based on Galoob's use of the
Game Genie to create altered play of Nintendo programs in the course of testing the product
and marketing it to show what the Genie could do. See Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of
Am., 780 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (N.D. Cal. 1991), affd, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582 (1993). The court rejected this claim as well. Id.
101Galoob, 780 F. Supp. at 1289 n.2. The trial court noted that there were many
interactive devices available in the marketplace which could be used to bring about or alter
the play of Nintendo videogames. Some of these devices, for example, permitted the play of
the games to be speeded up or allowed the user to skip lower levels of the game. Id. at 1288.
12 The Game Genie had two modes: a set-up mode in which the user could program the
Genie to alter specific aspects of the game, and a game play mode which implemented the
player's selections. During the set-up mode, the TV screen displayed the set of choices
available to the user who was able to enter between one and three codes for altered play of
the game. Although the book accompanying the Game Genie contained 1660 codes for
possible changes to the play of Nintendo games, only three temporary changes could be made
to the play of a Nintendo game at any one time. Id. at 1288-89.
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Nintendo games, thereby creating unauthorized derivative
works." a
Both the District Court and the Ninth Circuit had substantial
doubts about Nintendo's derivative work theory. The District Court
pointed out the ephemeral nature of the changed play of the
Nintendo games'" and the fact that only a small number of
changes could be made to the play of a game at any one time.105
The trial court also likened the modifications made through use of
the Game Genie to children altering the play of a copyrighted board
game, a use which Nintendo conceded would not infringe any
copyright."D The District Court pointed out that
[blecause of the technology involved, owners of
videogames are less able to experiment with or
change the method of play, absent an electronic
accessory such as the Game Genie. This should not
mean that holders of copyrighted video games are
entitled to broader protections or monopoly rights
than holders of other types of copyrighted games ....
Having paid Nintendo a fair return, the consumer
may experiment with the product and create new
variations of play, for personal enjoyment, without

103 17 USC § 106(2) (1988).
Nintendo relied on Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic
International, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983), to support its
derivative work theory. In Midway, the court ruled that the commercial distribution of a
circuit board that speeded up the play of videogames created an infringing derivative work
of the copyrighted games.
14 Gaoob, 780 F. Supp. at 1291. It is difficult to reconcile this rationale with the
subsequent Ninth Circuit ruling in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511
(9th Cir.) (holding that temporary copy of program in RAM was sufficiently fixed to be
infringing copy), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3396 (U.S. Oct. 26, 1993) (No. 93-809).
Richard Stern has pointed out that the derivative work right can be infringed by an
ephemeral instance of the work, as in a public performance of a choreographic work. Richard
H. Stern, The Game Genie Case: Copyright in Derivative Works Versus Users' Rights, 3 ENT.
L. REv. 104, 105-06 (1992).
' Galoob, 780 F. Supp. at 1291. This is a more persuasive rationale for rejecting
Nintendo's derivative work claim, for the altered play was likely so insubstantial a variation
on the play of the games that the Copyright Office would have refused to consider it a
derivative work had Nintendo sought to register the altered game as a separate work.
10Id.
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creating a derivative work." 7
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, quoted from legislative
history and the statutory definition of derivative work as indicating
that Congress had meant for the derivative work right to be
invoked only when a second work incorporated expression from the
first work, as when a screenplay implements the plot of a novel.108

However, even assuming the Game Genie did bring about an
unauthorized derivative work, neither court thought infringement
should be found because they were persuaded by Galoob's fair-use
defense.'"

'07Id. See also id. at 1294, 1298 (holding that amount and substantiality of fair use does
not weigh against fair use when game user has right to use entire game).
l Gaoob, 964 F.2d at 967-69. The Ninth Circuit contrasted Galoob's conduct with that
in Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1018 (1989), in which the defendant's physical incorporation of prints from
the plaintiffs book onto ceramic tiles was held to be an infringement of the derivative work
right. The principal defense in Mirage was that no infringement should be found because
the plaintiffs copyright interests had been satisfied by defendant's purchase of books
containing the prints. Considering the weight given in Galoob to the right of purchasers to
do as they wish with their copies of works, it is somewhat more difficult to reconcile Mirage
and Galoob than the Ninth Circuit's opinion might suggest.
For a discussion of the intended scope of the derivative work right, see, eg., MELVILLE
NUMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYMGHT § 8.09[A] (1992) (expressing view that
derivative work right may be superfluous). See also Pamela Samuelson, Allocating
OwnershipRights in Computer-GeneratedWorks, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1185, 1209-1221 (1986)
[hereinafter Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights] (discussing broad and narrow
conceptions of the derivative work right and expressing the author's agreement with the
interpretation of the derivative work theory adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Galoob). The
Ninth Circuit regarded the Seventh Circuit decision in Midway as having "stretched" the
concept of derivative works when ruling that the sale of chips that would speed up the play
of plaintiff's videogames was infringing. Galoob, 964 F.2d at 969 (citing Midway Mfg. Co.
v. Artic Intl, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1014 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983)). Without
indicating whether Midway was correctly decided, the Ninth Circuit indicated that stretching
the concept of derivative work any further would chill innovation and impede the free flow
of information. Id. The court mentioned add-on software as examples of beneficial advances
that should not be impeded (citing Christian H. Nadan, Note, A Proposal to Recognize
Component Works: How a Teddy Bears on the Competing Ends of Copyright Law, 78 CAL
L. REV. 1633 (1990)). Galoob, 964 F.2d at 969. See aiso Lotus Dev. Corp. v Paperback
Software Intl, 740 F. Supp. 37, 78-79 (D. Mass. 1990) (suggesting that add-on software
would be noninfringing).
109 See Galoob, 780 F. Supp. at 1292-98; Galoob, 964 F.2d at 969-72. Interestingly,
neither court gave any weight to the fact that the Game Genie had no purpose other than
to change the play of Nintendo games. That the ruling in Gaoob was by no means
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Under Sony, the Ninth Circuit was required to ignore Galoob's
obvious commercial purpose in marketing the Game Genie. °
The alleged underlying infringers in Galoob were consumers who
used the Game Genie to alter the play of Nintendo games in the
privacy of their homes. The court, therefore, invoked the Sony
presumption of fairness because consumers were making private
and noncommercial uses of the allegedly contributorily infringing
device."'
The court rejected Nintendo's argument that fair use should not
be found because of the unpublished nature of the works.112
Insofar as Nintendo's claim was that it had not published derivatives of the sort the Game Genie produced,1 its argument was
misplaced. The question was whether the games that Nintendo
had distributed were published or unpublished. The answer to that
question was clear: Nintendo had published millions of copies of its
games to anyone willing to pay the purchase price. The court also
observed that the logic of Nintendo's argument would virtually
eliminate fair-use defenses for subsequently created works. 4

inevitable is evidenced by the fact the trial court granted Nintendo's motion for a preliminary
injunction
and the appellate court had affirmed this ruling. Ga/oob, 780 F. Supp. 1286.
110
Nintendo had tried to argue that Galoob's purposes were commercial enough to give
rise to the Sony presumption of unfairness and also that unproductive uses were being made
of its work, which Nintendo argued also weighed against fair use. Id. at 1293 n.6. This was
rejected by the court for the obvious reason that Sony had also had a commercial purpose
in distributing the Betamax machine, yet the court focused its fair-use analysis on the
purposes of owners of Betamax machines. Galoob, 964 F.2d at 970. The trial court rejected
the productive-use argument, saying that Sony had minimized the importance of productive
uses. Ga/oob, 780 F. Supp. at 1293 n.6.
ld,; Galoob, 964 F.2d at 970.
i" Galoob, 964 F.2d at 970.
'ss By arguing that the versions of its games produced by use of the Game Genie were
unpublished works, Nintendo had hoped to invoke Harper & Row's virtual presumption
against fair use in cases involving unpublished works. Id. at 970-71. See infra note 133 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the more general arguments that have been made by
software publishers that their works are unpublished.
Nintendo's other argument on the second fair-use factor emphasized the creative nature
of its games and pointed to cases in which artistic and fanciful works have been given a
narrow scope of fair use. It is interesting to note that the trial court opinion does not discuss
this argument at all. The appellate court does not mention it in the part of the opinion
where it discusses the second fair-use factor, and only refers to it in a concluding portion of
the opinion as the most persuasive of Nintendo's arguments on the fair-use issue. Id. at 972.
114Id. at 970-71.
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Finding the substantiality of the alterations to Nintendo's games
through use of the Game Genie to be lesser in quantity and quality
than the copying in Sony, 15 the court in Galoob regarded this
factor as disfavoring Nintendo's fair-use defense as well.116
In reliance on Sony, the court thrust the burden onto Nintendo
to demonstrate some meaningful likelihood of harm arising from
use of the Game Genie.117 One of Nintendo's harm arguments
focused on the Game Genie's interference with Nintendo's game
quality control system which Nintendo asserted it had to maintain
in order to prevent a collapse of the videogame market.1 s Nintendo's other principal harm argument was that the Game Genie
interfered with Nintendo's opportunities for marketing altered
games. The court was not persuaded by either argument, pointing
out that Nintendo had no plans to market versions of its games
containing alterations of the sort that the Game Genie produced. 9 The factor that may have most swayed the court on the
harm issue, however, was that consumers could only use the Genie
if they had already bought Nintendo games, which meant that the
Game Genie did not displace sales of the Nintendo programs. 20
B. SEGA V. ACCOLADE

Sega sued Accolade for copyright infringement because Accolade
made copies of Sega programs in the course of trying to develop
115 Galoob, 780 F. Supp. at 1293. Nintendo's argument concerning the substantiality
factor cannot be discerned from the published opinions. Its argument may have been that
Galoob's use of the Nintendo games should be regarded as qualitatively substantial because
it affected the play ofso many different Nintendo games and because the alterations affected
key aspects of the play and important characters in the games.
...
Id. The appellate opinion seems to have accepted the trial court's analysis on this
point. See Galoob, 964 F.2d at 971.
117Galoob, 964 F.2d at 971. The trial court opinion has a much more extensive analysis
of Nintendo's harm theories. See Galoob, 780 F. Supp. at 1295-98.
"sGaloob, 964 F.2d at 971-72. See generally DAVID SHEFF, GAME OVER: How NINTENDO
ZAPPED AN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, CAPTURED YOUR DOLLARS, AND ENSLAVED YOUR CHILDREN

(1993) (detailing early collapse of videogame market and how Nintendo revived it through
restrictive licensing and other quality control procedures).
..
'Galoob, 964 F.2d at 971-72. The fourth fair-use factor is concerned not simply with
present harms to present markets, but with "the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the work." 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
' Gadoob, 780 F. Supp. at 1294; Gaioob, 964 F.2d at 971. This issue came up repeatedly
in beth the trial and appellate court opinions.
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games that would operate in Sega's Genesis machines. 21 Accolade admitted "disassembling" Sega programs (an act which
necessarily involves copying) in order to gain access to information
about how to construct games that would be compatible with
Genesis machines. 122 This was information that Sega made
available to other game developers only under restrictive licensing
agreements and for which licensees had to pay.
Sega was not claiming that any of Accolade's games contained
expression from Sega programs,"2 except as to one short sequence of initialization code.' 2 '
Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). In order for
programs to interoperate with other programs or with hardware, the programs must be
constructed to accept and receive certain inputs in accordance with a precise set of protocols.
The aspects of programs that allow them to interact and interoperate with other programs
or machines are known as "interfaces.' Program interfaces are, in effect, information
equivalents to the standard configuration for plugs and plug sockets by which people
routinely cause electrical equipment to interoperate.
Programs are generally written in human-readable source code form, and then
transformed by compiler or assembler programs into a machine-readable form, generally
referred to as object code. Programs are most often commercially distributed in object code
form. But many programs are now available that permit the disassembly or decompilation
of object code into a more human-readable form. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514-15 n.2. The
issue of the legality of disassembly or decompilation of a competitor's program had been the
subject of much disagreement among intellectual property professionals for years before the
Sega case raised it in litigation. For a concise history of this controversy, see Litman, supra
note 77, at 196-201.
' Sega did not argue that Accolade's programs infringed because of its reproduction of
the interface information embodied in Sega's programs, although arguments have sometimes
been made that interfaces are expressive elements of programs. See, e.g., William T. Lake,
et al., Tampering With Fundamentals: A Critique of Proposed Changes in EC Software
Protection, 6 COMPUTER LAW. 1 (1989). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected such
an argument, ruling that aspects of programs necessary for achieving interoperability are
not protectable by copyright law. See Computer Assocs. Intl v. Altai, Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1241 (2d Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit in Sega indicated its intent to follow this
precedent. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524-26.
' The Ninth Circuit's October 20, 1992 opinion in Sega did not address the claim of
infringement based on reproduction of a short sequence of initialization code because Sega
had not emphasized it in its briefs or argument. The court's amended opinion addressed this
"belated" claim in a footnote. The court ruled that reproduction of this short sequence of
code was noninfringing, offering several rationales for this ruling: that it was a fair use
and/or because the code sequence was too functional or short to be protectable by copyright.
Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524 n.7. A subsequent trial court opinion has interpreted this aspect of
the Sega ruling as an instance of an idea/expression merger. See Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of Am., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8183 (N.D. Cal. April 15, 1993). Although this may
be an acceptable interpretation of Sega, it is worth noting that the Ninth Circuit did not
mention the merger doctrine. See infra notes 184-187 and accompanying text for a
2
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Rather, the claim was that the intermediate copying of the
program to determine how to construct a program that would work
in the Genesis machine was itself infringing."
Sega sought to
stop distribution of Accolade games on the ground that as the final
result of an unlawful disassembly process, it was an infringing
derivative work; the fruit, so to speak, of the poisonous tree of
disassembly.1'
Accolade's principal defense127 was that this
intermediate copying of Sega's code was a fair use.1"

discussion of the Sega ruling on the initialization code sequence as a fair use under
principles deriving from Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
' The Computer & Business Equipment Manufacturers Association supported Sega's
position on fair use through a brief amicus curiae submitted to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which was also signed by Professor Arthur Miller. Professor Miller has recently
published an article critical of the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Sega. See Arthur R. Miller,
Copyright ProtectionFor ComputerPrograms,Databases,and Computer Generated Works:
Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARv. L. REV. 977 (1993).
' The trial court granted Sega's request for an injunction not only against further
disassembly of Sega's programs but also against Accolade's distribution of games embodying
information derived from the disassembly process. See Sega, 785 F. Supp. at 1402. For a
critique of Sega's afruit of the poisonous tree" argument, see Brief Amicus Curiae of the
American Committee for Interoperable Systems at 12-14, Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,
977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (No. 92-15655) [hereinafter ACIS Amicus Brief] (citing
authorities and reasons why this theory is erroneous). The prominent copyright scholar
Professor Paul Goldstein, of Stanford Law School, was a signatory to this brief.
' Accolade raised three other defenses: that intermediate copying should be excused
because the final product sold on the market was noninfringing; that decompilation was
always excusable in order to get access to functional elements that were unprotectable under
17 U.S.C. § 102(b); and that 17 U.S.C. § 117, which allows copying of computer programs in
order to use them in a computer or to have a backup, could be construed to permit
deeompilation. The Ninth Circuit rejected all three of these defenses. Sega, 977 F.2d at
1518-20.
'" In addition to the ACIS Amicus Brief, supra note 126, the Computer and Communications Industry Association submitted a brief amicus curiae in support of Accolade's position
in Sega, as did eleven professors of copyright law. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Eleven
CopyrightLaw Professorsin Sega Enterprises,Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 33 JURIMETRCS J. 147
(1992) [hereinafter Law Professor Amicus Brief]. Signatories to the law professor brief were:
Ralph S. Brown, Yale Law School; Stephen L. Carter, Yale Law School; Peter A. Jaszi, The
American University; Dennis S. Karjala, Arizona State University (principal author); David
L. Lange, Duke University; Peter S. Menell, University of California at Berkeley; L. Ray
Patterson, University of Georgia; Leo J. Raskind, University of Minnesota; Jerome H.
Reichman, Vanderbilt Law School; David A. Rice, Rutgers NewHouse Center for Law &
Justice; and Pamela Samuelson, University of Pittsburgh. See also LaSTFrontierConference
Report on CopyrightProtectionof Computer Software, 30 JUIUMETRICS J. 15 (1989) (reporting
that ten intellectual property scholars had reached consensus that kind of intermediate
copying done in Sega should be regarded as fair and noninfringing use of copyrighted
program at conference sponsored by Arizona State University College of Law's Center for
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Sega sought to invoke the Sony presumption against fair use by
characterizing the purpose of Accolade's use as commercial. 2"

The appellate court, however, perceived Accolade as having made
copies of the Sega program in order to study it and discern how to

make compatible but otherwise quite different and original
programs to run on Sega machines. Accolade's development of new

noninfringing programs contributed to achievement of the main
goals of the copyright system of encouraging the "growth of creative
expression" and introducing new independently created works into
the market." °

These legitimate purposes overcame the Sony

presumption of unfairness.1"'
The appellate court regarded the nature-of-the-work factor as
favoring a finding of fair use as well. With a brief citation to
Galoob,'3 2 the Ninth Circuit dispensed with Sega's argument that
the unpublished nature of the work disfavored a finding of fair

use."

The court focused instead on the nature of computer

Law, Science, and Technology). Signatories to this report were: Donald S. Chisum,
University of Washington; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, New York University; Paul Goldstein,
Stanford University; Robert A. Gorman, University of Pennsylvania; Dennis S. Karjala,
Arizona State University; Edmund W. Kitch, University of Virginia; Peter S. Menell,
Georgetown University; Leo J. Raskind, University of Minnesota; Jerome H. Reichman,
Vanderbilt University; and Pamela Samuelson, University of Pittsburgh.
1 Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992). See also
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (also ruling that
decompilation in order to develop compatible videogames would be fair use of copyrighted
program). The Ninth Circuit opinion in Sega indicates that the Atari Games opinion "is
consistent both with our analysis and with the result we reach." Sega, 977 F.2d at 1513-14
n.1.
no Sega at 1523.
'a Id at 1522-23. The Ninth Circuit rejected the District Court's conclusion that it was
feasible to reverse engineer without making disassembly copies. Id. at 1525-26.
' Id. at 1526 n.9 (citing Galoob, 964 F.2d at 970, discussed supra notes 100-120 and
accompanying text).
' Sega had sought to invoke the virtual presumption of unfairness for cases involving
unpublished works deriving from the Supreme Court's decision in Harper & Row Publishers
v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). Id. at 1526 n.9. Professor Litman traces the
theory of software as an unpublished work to William Patry. Litman, supranote 77, at 194.
Litman also discusses the efforts of some major software producers to promote this view
during congressional hearings on proposed amendments to copyright's fair-use provision that
would make clear that the unpublished status of a work did not preclude a finding of fair
use. Id. at 193-201. Congress has since amended § 107 to make clear that the unpublished
nature of a work is not a bar to finding fair use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. IV 1993).
There are at least three respects in which one might argue that programs such as Sega's
games should be treated as unpublished works. For one thing, Sega distributes only object
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programs as utilitarian works.1 ' Such works, the court observed,
contain many functional elements that are not protectable by
copyright law." Some of these unprotectable elements cannot be
discerned by the user when running the program.'- The court
recognized that it is sometimes necessary to make intermediate
copies of a program in order to get access to unprotected elements
of programs, such as information necessary to make a compatible
program.
The court was disturbed by the implications of Sega's argument,
observing that "[i]f disassembly of copyrighted object code is per se
an unfair use, the owner of the copyright gains a de facto monopoly

code versions of their games, implicitly expressing thereby an intention that the source code
versions should be kept as trade secrets. Because the goal of Accolade's disassembly was to
get access to the contents of the unpublished source code version of the program that Sega
keeps under lock and key, it was aiming to create a copy of that unpublished source code (or
an equivalent to it). Second, any assembly-language version of Sega's programs is a copy of
the program that Sega has not distributed, which arguably renders it unpublished. Third,
many mass-marketed computer programs, such as Sega's games, are distributed with shrinkwrap licenses that announce limitations on usage which arguably give the restricted-use copy
an unpublished status. See Karen Puhala, Note, The Protection of Computer Software
Through Shrink-Wrap License Agreements, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1347, 1379-80 (1985)
(arguing that shrink-wrap restrictions give rise to "limited publication" of object code which
renders it an unpublished work). But see Richard H. Stern, Shrink-Wrap Licenses of MassMarketed Software: Enforceable Contractsor Whistling in the Dark?, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. 51 (1985); David A. Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer ProgramCopies and
the Copyright Act First Sale Doctrine, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 157 (1990) (beth critical of this
view).
18 The Law Professor Amicus Brief had strongly emphasized the utilitarian nature of
software in its assessment of the nature-of-the-work factor. See Law Professor Amicus Brief,
supra note 128, at 151-59.
w Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524-25. The court traced the rule that copyright protection for
works with 'strong functional components" is narrower than for works of fiction to the
Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). See also 2 PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW & PRACTICE § 8.5 (1989); Jerome H. Reichman,
Goldstein on CopyrightLaw: A Realist's Approach To a TechnologicalAge, 43 STAN. L. REV.
943, 970-76 (1991) [hereinafter Reichman, Goldstein on Copyright] (discussing Goldstein's
interpretation of copyright law as applied to functional works, including computer programs,
and reasons for regarding copyright protection for such works as "thin").
1N
The unprotected aspects of most functional works are readily accessible
to the human eye ....
Computer programs, however, are typically
distributed for public use in object code form, embedded in a silicon chip
or on a floppy disk. For that reason, humans cannot gain access to the
unprotected ideas and functional concepts contained in object code
without disassembling that code-i.e., making copies.
Sega, 977 F.2d at 1525.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol1/iss1/6

34

Samuelson: Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in

19931

FAIR USE FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS

over the functional aspects of his work-aspects that were expressly denied copyright protection by Congress."13 7 To enjoy a lawful
monopoly over the idea or functional principle underlying a work,
said the court, "the creator of the work must satisfy
the more
1
stringent standards imposed by the patent laws." 3
Although Accolade had copied the whole of the Sega program, the
Ninth Circuit thought it had done so only as an intermediate step
in the process of developing a noninfringing program. The court
cited Sony for the proposition that even copying the whole work did
not preclude a fmding of fair use.13 9 Accolade's use of the intermediate 14copy was so limited that this factor was "of very little
"
weight. 0
Sega's effort to place the burden on Accolade to show lack of
41
harm to Sega's market or potential markets was unavailing.
Nor was the court persuaded by Sega's assertions that harm to its
market flowed from the fact that Accolade's games directly
142
competed with Sega-produced and Sega-licensed games.
Noninfringing works often compete in the marketplace to appeal to
consumer choices. If consumers preferred Accolade's games to
those produced by Sega or its licensees, that might hurt Sega's
market. As long as Accolade produced its own creative programs,
however, Accolade should be regarded as engaging in the kind of
competition that copyright law is supposed to encourage."
Id. at 1526 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988)).
Id. See also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(arguing that society should be free to exploit ideas and processes of copyrighted work and
that authors do not hold exclusive rights to entire contents of literary work).
' Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992).
's

140

141

Id.

Sony indicates that presumption of harm arises from a commercial use. Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). However, since the Ninth Circuit
was persuaded that Accolade's principal purpose was to do legitimate research, the
presumption of harm was not invoked by the court in Sega.
' One plausible harm argument that seems not to have been made by Sega was that
Sega typically charges a fee for giving game developers access to information about how to
make games compatible with the Genesis console. Accolade's activities undermined this
licensing system to some degree.
1
'4
[A]n attempt to monopolize the market by making it impossible for others to compete
runs counter to the statutory purpose of promoting creative expression and cannot constitute
a strong equitable basis for resisting the invocation of the fair use doctrine." Sega, 977 F.2d
at 1523-24. The court pointed out that consumers typically buy many games for their Sega
machines, so that it was far from clear that Sega's sales were affected by the availability of
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C. THE IMPORTANCE OF SONY FOR THE GALOOB AND SEGA DECISIONS

Sony had a profound influence on both the Sega and Galoob
decisions. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine either case having been
decided in the same way had the dispute in Sony been decided in
Universal's favor. All three decisions reflect a perception of
copyright as a regulatory regime in which the public interest must
be taken into account in the balancing of interests among participants in commercial markets.
The influence of Sony on the Ninth Circuit's Galoob decision is
easily discerned. The invocation of the dual presumptions of
fairness and of lack of harm arising from the private noncommercial nature of the alleged infringing conduct is the most obvious
respect in which Sony was an important precedent in Galoob. But
this was by no means all the Galoob court derived from Sony. The
Ninth Circuit also noted that
Sony recognizes that a party who distributes a
copyrighted work cannot dictate how that work is to
be enjoyed. Consumers may use a Betamax to view
copyrighted works at a more convenient time. They
similarly may use a Game Genie to enhance a
Nintendo Game cartridge's audiovisual play in such
a way as to make the experience more enjoyable.144
Thus, Galoob, like Sony, gives substantial weight to the interests
of consumers in having access to and the ability to use new
electronic information tools that enhance their enjoyment of
copyrighted works."
Harkening back to Professor Patterson's
terminology, one might characterize the Game Genie as extending
the ordinary uses consumers could make of their copies of copy-

Accolade games. Id. at 1523. The court emphasized that Accolade had copied the Sega
program to get access to compatibility information that was not available in any other way,
and to give Sega the remedy it sought would be to defeat rather than enhance the ultimate
purposes of copyright. Id. at 1522-23.
1" Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of Am., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1582 (1993).
" See also PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 87 (referring to consumer's interest in
his or her copy of copyrighted work).
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righted works."
Because consumers were not using the copyright or engaging in competitive activity, no infringement was or
should have been found. The implications of Galoob for other
electronic information tools for extending ordinary uses consumers
can make of their copies of copyrighted works will be explored in
Section V.
The Sony opinion was also an important precedent for the ruling
in Sega, although in different ways than Sega had hoped. Notwithstanding Sony's dual presumptions of unfairness if the user's
purpose was commercial and of harm from a commercial use, the
Ninth Circuit relied upon other facts about Accolade's purposes and
the potential market effects of Accolade's actions in deciding that
the first and fourth fair-use factors actually favored Accolade, not
Sega.147 Only the third factor was said to weigh in Sega's favor,
and it did so only weakly.'" Sony was obviously a crucial precedent for Accolade's argument that fair use could be found even
when the whole of a work was copied. 49
Less obvious, perhaps, was the importance of Sony as a precedent
cautioning that courts should be circumspect when construing the
reach of copyright to deal with new technology issues that the
courts had not addressed before."W The court cited Sony for the
proposition that when a new technology presented an issue that
rendered application of copyright law uncertain or ambiguous,
courts should construe that law in light of its basic purposes. 5 '
Thus, the Sega decision, like Sony, reflects the view that courts
should consider the impact its ruling would have on fulfillment of
14 See discussion of Patterson articles, supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text
(regarding
fair uses consumer can make of copyrighted work).
147 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1527.
46

I
/d.

Sega seems to fulfill the prediction made some years ago by Professor Leo Raskind
that the reverse engineering privilege of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act (S.C.P.A.),
17 U.S.C. § 906(a), might have broader implications for unfair competition law and for
applications of the fair-use doctrine in copyright law. See Leo J. Raskind, Reverse
Engineering,Unfair Competition,and FairUse, 70 MINN. L. REv. 385, 387 (1985). Sega had
sought to use the special reverse engineering privilege of S.C.PA to argue that absent a
special statutory privilege of this sort in copyright law, infringement should be found. The
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1521.
"0 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1527 (The court recognized that computer software "presented a
relatively unexplored area in the world of copyright law.").
151Id.
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the ultimate societal and constitutional purposes of copyright as an
important component in judging whether a particular use is
fair.152 In addition, much the same concern is exhibited in Sega,
as in Sony, that courts should be vigilant to ensure that copyright
owners not obtain an undue extension of their statutory monopoly
beyond that which Congress had intended."s
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SEGA FOR OTHER SoFrwARE
COPYRIGHT DISPUTES
Although the Sega decision is so recent that its influence on other
decisions has been minimal, 1" it is readily apparent that this
decision may have broad implications for other copyright decisions
involving computer programs. Sega will certainly be an important
precedent for future cases in which competitors or consumers claim
fair use for their decompilation or disassembly of software for
purposes other than obtaining compatibility information. The
decision may have more indirect but nonetheless important
implications for other situations in which second comers may wish
to make use of certain functional elements of software or otherwise
to make unauthorized uses of software which they have acquired
in the marketplace.
A. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SEGA FOR OTHER DECOMPILATIONS OR
DISASSEMBLIES OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Sega makes clear that when decompilation or disassembly of a
mass-marketed program is a necessary step in the development of
a compatible computer program, such intermediate copying will be
privileged under the fair-use doctrine. Whether decompilation or
disassembly undertaken to gain access to other unprotectable
elements of programs should be regarded as fair use is a question

"Id.

"'Id.
at 1526.
15

The Ninth Circuit's Sega decision has influenced decisions in the dispute between two
other videogame competitors, Atari Games and Nintendo. See Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (interpreting Sega as suggesting that, under
the appropriate factual setting, copyright misuse may be viable defense against claim of
copyright infringement).
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the court did not address directly.
Those who urged the Ninth Circuit to rule in Sega's favor can be
expected to give the decision the narrowest of constructions.'5
They will likely view Sega as no broader-and potentially narrower-than the European Community's Directive on Copyright
Protection for Computer Programs, which treats decompilation of
a computer program as copyright infringement except to the extent
necessary to obtain information needed to construct an interoperable program. 1 The potential for Sega to be narrower than the
EC Directive arises from the fact that the EC Directive does not
permit enforcement of contractual restrictions on decompilation for
purposes of achieving interoperability.157 Because there is no
comparable limitation in the United States copyright law and
because of the Ninth Circuit's deference to licensing restrictions in
another recent software copyright decision, 1" those who oppose
decompilation and disassembly will likely look to licensing restrictions as a way to stop decompilation for all1purposes,
including that
59
of gaining access to interface information.

See supra note 125 (listing supporters of Sega's position on fair use).
See Council of the European Communities, Directive on the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, Article 6.1, reprintedin 42 PAT., TRADEMARK, & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA)
109 (1991) [hereinafter EC Directive] (noting that authorization of copyright holder is
unnecessary if information is indispensable to interoperability of independent program and
available elsewhere).
'6 Id.

MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computers, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), petition for cert.
filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3396 (U.S. Oct. 26, 1993) (No. 93-809). In this case, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that making a temporary copy in the RAM of a second computer of a computer
program that had been licensed for use on only one computer was an infringement. No fairuse defense was apparently raised in the case. Rather, Peak was defending the action by
asserting that a temporary copy in RAM didn't satisfy the fixation requirement necessary
for it to be a *copy" within the statutory definition. Peak argued that it could thus not be
a violation of the exclusive right to reproduce the work in copies. Peak also sought to justify
its copying under § 117, but the Ninth Circuit ruled that this provision did not apply to Peak
because it was a licensee rather than an owner of a copy of MAI's program. This ruling has
potentially devastating implications for the market for third-party support services for
software. See BriefAmicus Curiae of Independent Service Network International In Support
of Petition For Rehearing With Suggestion of Rehearing En Banc, MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak
Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) (No. 92-55363).
' For an argument that this strategy should not always be successful, see David A. Rice,
Public Goods, Private Contract,and Public Policy: FederalPreemption Of Software License
ProhibitionsAgainst Reverse Engineering,53 U. PITT. L. REV. 543 (1992).
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Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether licensing
can effectively reverse the results of Sega," it is worth considering how broad or narrow the ruling may be when the product being
decompiled or disassembled is mass-marketed software for which
licensing restrictions are, as a practical matter, infeasible.
The Ninth Circuit emphasized in Sega that someone who raises
a fair-use defense for decompiling or disassembling another firm's
program must have a legitimate purpose for this activity and that
no other means of access to the information must be available.'6 l
However, the court did not explicitly limit the scope of permissible
decompilation to those situations in which decompilation is needed
to obtain access to information necessary to permit development of
an interoperable program. It simply gave the search for interface
information as an example of a legitimate purpose. Although the
Ninth Circuit rejected Accolade's argument that decompilation
should always be regarded as noninfringing conduct, 6 ' it is
possible to envision a number of situations in which fair-use
defenses might still have reasonable prospects for success consistent with the Sega ruling.'63
If, for example, decompilation was the only way to obtain
information needed to correct an error in the program or was
otherwise necessary to permit the owner of a copy of a computer
program to make adaptations to make the software usable for its
intended purposes, this should be permissible under the fair-use

"mAlthough licensing restrictions on decompilation or disassembly may be given effect
when they are the bargained product of a negotiation, it is worth pointing out that fair-use
defenses are not necessarily unavailable simply because the work is licensed. See infra notes
166, 171 and accompanying text. It is also conceivable that a firm with a dominant position
in the market might be regarded as misusing its copyrights, or as acting unfairly in the
context of a fair-use defense, if it prohibits all forms of access to interface information. See
generally Paul Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in ComputerPrograms,47 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 1119, 1126-30 (1986) (predicting that copyright misuse doctrine might be called upon
to resolve some computer program copyright disputes, including some involving operating
system programs; also predicting a rise in successful fair-use defenses in computer program
cases).
161Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514 (9th Cir. 1992).
l2 Id. at 1519-20.
'"5 See, eg., Dennis S. Karjala, Recent United States and InternationalDevelopments in
Software Protection, EuRoPEAN INTELL PROp. REV. (forthcoming 1994) (noting that Sega's
reasoning is not limited to interoperability).
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The copyright statute explicitly gives owners of
doctrine.'"
copies of programs the right to make adaptations to their copy of
the software." Unless one has access to the source code of the
software or other extensive documentation about the internals of
the software,'" decompilation may be the only way to get access
to the text of the program to obtain information necessary to fix an
error in the software that has caused it to malfunction.
Congress would surely not have given owners of programs the
right to make adaptations to software, while at the same time
denying users access to the information that would make it possible
to perform those adaptations.'6 7 Pro-consumer principles from
the Sony case, as well as pro-competition policies from the Ninth
Circuit ruling in Sega, would support finding fair use when
decompilation was necessary to permit an error to be corrected or
to make other reasonable adaptations.'
Decompilation might also be a fair use under Sega if necessary
to enable a firm to determine whether a competitor's product
infringed the copyright in its product such as copying of nonliteral

' See, eg., Pamela Samuelson, Reverse-Engineering Someone Else's Software: Is It
Legal?, IEEE SoFrWARE, Jan. 1990, at 94. The Ninth Circuit in Sega decided it need not
decide whether § 117 permits only adaptations for uses intended by the copyright owner, as
Sega argued, or for the consumer's range of uses. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1520 n.6. The court did
note, however, that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had interpreted § 117 as not
restricting the range of intended uses to those intended by the copyright owner. See Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988).
'm See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988) (providing defense to infringement claim if owner of copy
of computer program makes or authorizes making of some adaptations to copy).
16 In recognition of the legitimate concerns of users for access to source code or other
documentation for purposes such as fixing errors in the event that the software's developer
is either unwilling or unable to provide maintenance services, it is becoming more common
for software developers to agree to escrow source code and documentation with a third party
so that such access can be had. See, e.g., Kevin Deasy & Anne C. Martin, Licensing of
Intellectual Property Rights Needed For Software Support: A Life Cycle Approach, 28
JuRnIwMrcs J. 223 (1988) (discussing planning for software support through licensing
arrangements to provide access and rights to source codes and other software related
documentation).
'6 See Vault, 847 F.2d 255 (striking down portions of Louisiana statute purporting to
validate shrink-wrap restrictions on such things as making back up copies, decompilation,
and modification of software, finding statute and restrictions it permitted to be in conflict
with federal copyright policy).
168 As with decompilation to obtain interface information, Sega would seem to direct a
court in ruling on this kind of fair-use defense to consider whether the error correction
information was available other than by decompilation.
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Decompilation

would not be necessary if infringement was apparent from the
copying of user interface elements, but it may sometimes be

necessary to detect nonliteral infringement. It is very likely that
the Ninth Circuit would regard good faith efforts to detect infringement as legitimate purposes under Sega."70

Even those who have been most adamant that commercial
decompilers such as Accolade should be regarded as infringers have

often been willing to admit that decompilation of program code
should sometimes be permissible under copyright law's fair-use
doctrine."' The example generally cited is that of a computer
scientist who decompiles a program in order to discover an
innovative technique embodied in the program that has not been
publicly disclosed.17 2

The purpose of the copying would be for

noncommercial research purposes. As in Sega, the key factor
concerning the nature of the protected work would be that it was
distributed in object code, a form of the program in which the
contents are inaccessible except through decompilation or disassem-

bly. The whole of the work would likely be copied, but as in Sega,
no harm to market
the copy would be intermediate in nature and
17 3
interests of copyright concern would occur.

169See, e.g., E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985)
(plaintiff had decompiled defendant's program to determine whether it infringed).
10 By being so restrictive about decompilation (making it available only to get access to
interface information), the EC Directive would seem to deprive owners of copyrights in
computer programs of an effective technique for protection of their rights under copyright
law.
17 See, eg., Allen IL Grogan, Decompilation and Disassembly: Undoing Software
Protection, 1 COMPUTER LAW. 1 (Jan. 1984) (arguing decompilation not published or done for
financial gain, and undertaken by computer science students in attempt to learn programming techniques could constitute fair use); Duncan M. Davidson, Common Law, Uncommon
Software, 47 U. PMTT. L. REV. 1037, 1092-99 (1986) (stating that fair-use doctrine allows
researcher to analyze certain programming techniques and other ideas as long as information
gained is not used for competitive or public purposes).
''
See sources cited supra in notes 171 and 125.
173Davidson argues that the computer scientist should be forbidden to publish the results
of his research because this publication would destroy the trade secret status of the
technique which would harm the developer's market interests. Davidson, supra note 171,
at 1092-93. It is worth noting that decompilation for scientific research purposes is not
permissible under the EC Directive. The Directive goes so far as to forbid member states
from using fair use or similar privileges to grant broader rights to decompile software than
that granted by the directive for gaining access to interface information. See Article 6 of EC
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A seemingly harder fair-use question is posed if a commercial
developer of software decompiles a program to get access to an
unpatented algorithm embodied in it and then uses this algorithm
when developing a competing program.
Some may argue that such a commercial developer should be
treated as an infringer on the ground that an algorithm is part of
a program's "structure, sequence, and organization" that should be
protectable by copyright law.174 Unless no other algorithm could
be used for a particular function, the reproduction of the algorithm
would be claimed as an appropriation of expression.17 Under
this theory, two claims of copyright infringement would arise. One
would arise from the appropriation of an expressive algorithm. A
second would arise because the decompilation itself would not be
fair since a decompilation to get access to expression would not
seem to be a legitimate purpose under Sega.
Even if a court regarded the algorithm as an unprotectable
element of a program, those who disfavor decompilation would
likely argue that competitive decompilation to get access to an
algorithm is unfair. They would tend to emphasize two things: the
commercial nature of the developer's purpose and the harm that
would arise from letting a competitor take a free ride on an
innovator's work.
A developer who decompiled a competitor's program to get access
to an algorithm would certainly have a strong commercial motive
for its decompilation. The Ninth Circuit said it employed the

Directive, supra note 156. The Directive would also seem to regard a publication of interface
information properly obtained by decompilation as infringing conduct except to the extent
it permitted use of the interoperable program. It is more difficult to imagine an American
court forbidding a lawful decompiler from publishing information or other unprotectable
elements of a program in an article or other independently created original work.
174 The principal case seeming to recognize copyright protection for the structure,
sequence and organization of programs is Whelan Associates. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories,
797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). Some have argued that
because algorithms are as valuable as code (if not more so), copyright law should protect
them as well. See also, Virginia Johnson, Note, Copyright Protection for Computer Flow
Logic
and Algorithms, 5 CoMPUTER/L.J. 259 (1984).
176 This result would be consistent with Whelan, which has, however, been much criticized
for having an overbroad view of the scope of copyright protection in computer programs.
Whelan, 797 F.2d 1222. See Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir.
1992) and Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (2d Cir. 1992)
(rejecting Whelan approach as overbroad).
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Harper& Row presumption of unfairness when the defendant had
a commercial purpose in Sega.116 However, the court in that case
treated the presumption as a relatively weak one that was easily
overcome by a disassembler's research purposes. Other courts have
treated the Sony presumption of unfairness for commercial
purposes as a very strong one, 177 and perhaps the Ninth Circuit
would do so in a different case. If the second developer uses the
algorithm in a subsequently developed competing program, the
second developer may have taken a partial free ride on innovation
from the first firm's work, which courts generally disfavor.178 If
the decompiler's software is a competitive substitute for the first
firm's software, some would argue this gives rise to a stronger
potential
for harm to the first firm's market than was true in
179
Sega.
Such arguments, however, are not sound as a matter of copyright
law. That is, algorithms are not expressive elements of copyrighted
works, and under Sega, it should be as fair for a competing
developer to decompile a program to get access to an unpatented
algorithm as it now is to decompile to get access to information
needed to develop a compatible program.
An algorithm is a finite method or procedure for performing a
task."s° The text of section 102(b) states: "In no event does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
'76

Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522.

See, e.g., Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1436-37 (6th Cir. 1992),
cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
178
See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1237-38 (holding that copyright infringement is not rendered
less damaging by fact that infringer expended substantial time and effort in copying original
work). See also Miller, supra note 125, at 1026 (disfavoring free use of decompilation due
to discrepancy between cost of creating software and cost of duplicating it). It is worth
pointing out, however, that a very considerable amount of work is required to disassemble
or decompile a program and learn anything useful from it (such as how to develop a
compatible program or what algorithm underlies someone's program). But see Feist
Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1990) (allowing defendants to take a free
ride on use of unprotectable elements from a plaintiff's work may promote the purposes of
copyright law).
', One reason the Ninth Circuit gave for finding insignificant harm to Sega's market was
that consumers buy multiple games; thus, Accolade's games would not necessarily displace
sales of Sega's games. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
7

18 DONALD KNUTH, THE ART OF COMPUTER PROGRAMMING: FUNDAMENTAL ALGORITHMS

1-6 (2d ed. 1973).
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principle or discovery." l"1 A plain reading of this provision would
indicate that an algorithm embodied in a computer program is
unprotectable by copyright law because it is, by definition, a
procedure or method embodied in the text of a program.
Further evidence that algorithms are beyond the scope of
copyright comes from the legislative history of section 102(b), for
both the House and Senate Reports indicate that this provision was
added to the statute in response to concerns expressed in congressional hearings that without a provision of this sort, some software
developers might try to claim copyright protection for methods and
procedures embodied in programs."m Section 102(b), say these
reports, was "intended to make clear that the expression adopted
by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer
program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the
program are not within the scope of copyright.""s
In addition, it appears that the "procedure, process, system, [and]
method of operation" language of section 102(b) derives from the
landmark Baker v. Selden case and its progeny. 1 Because the
organization of the headings and columns in Selden's ledger sheets
were constituent elements of the accounting system, Baker did not
infringe Selden's copyright when he reproduced this arrangement

181 17

U.S.C.

§ 102(b) (1988).

H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.

5659, 5670; S. REP No. 473, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976). It was Arthur Miller whose
testimony expressed concern that without a provision such as § 102(b), copyrights in
computer programs would be used to get patent-like protection for valuable aspects of
programs, such as methods and procedures. See Copyright Revision Act of 1967: Hearings
On S. 597 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Patents,Trademarks,and Copyrightsof the Comm.

on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 197 (1967). After becoming a paid consultant for
certain software producers, Miller has converted to the copyright maximalist camp. See
Miller, supra note 125.
'

H.R REP. No. 1476 at 57; S. REP. No. 473.
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (holding accounting system uncopyrightable). See

generally Pamela Samuelson, Computer Programs, User Interfaces, and Section 102(b): A

Critique ofLotus v. Paperback,6 HIGH TECH. L.J. 209 (1991) (discussing Baker v. Selden and
its progeny).

See also Letter from Professor Arthur I. Miller, Professor, Harvard Law

School, to Salem M. Katsh, Esq., Wel, Gotshal & Manges (Oct. 29, 1985) (on file with
author) (expressing the view that § 102(b) codifies Baker v. Selden; also indicating that it was
for patent law, not copyright, to protect the methods and processes embodied in software).
Among the cases expressing the view that § 102(b) codified the holding of Baker v. Selden
is NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1177, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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in the ledger sheets in his book on the same accounting system.'"
Copyright protected only Selden's explanation of the system.
To get exclusive rights for a system, process, or method of
operation described in a book, the Court stated that one would have
to go to the Patent Office. " "To give the author of a book an
exclusive property in the art described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise
and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters patent,
not of copyright."" 7 Thus, an additional reason why computer
program algorithms should not be regarded as expressive elements
of programs, notwithstanding the contribution they may make to
the structure or organization of the program, is that patents are
issuing with frequency now for innovative program algorithms.'
It would upset the economic balance Congress meant to establish
for the patent and copyright systems to allow software developers
to use copyright to protect utilitarian elements of programs that are
"better left to the more exacting standards of patent ... law,"ls
such as algorithms.
If algorithms are among the "procedures" and "methods" that
Congress intended to exclude from copyright protection by enactment of section 102(b), the Sega decision can fairly be read to mean
that disassembling or decompiling a program in order to get access
to an unpatented algorithm should be regarded as a fair use as

1 For a discussion of Baker v. Selden as a case in which the arrangement of words was
a constituent element of a system, see Pamela Samuelson, A Critique ofLotus v. Paperback,
supra note 184 at 226-235. See also Law Professor Amicus Brief, supra note 128, at 6-7;
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 223 (D. Mass. 1993) (characterizing
Baker v. Selden as holding that constituent elements of system cannot be protected by
copyright law).
' Selden had failed to get a patent for his bookkeeping system. See Samuelson,
Modifying Software, supra note 2, at 231.
187Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at 102.
"8 See Donald S. Chisum, The PatentabilityofAlgorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REv. 959 (1986)
(arguing that algorithms should be protected by patent if the novelty and unobviousness
standards are met); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent
ProtectionForAlgorithms and Other ComputerProgram-RelatedInventions, 39 EMORY L.J.
1025 (1990).
1802 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES, LAW & PRACTICE § 8.5, at 116-17 (1989).
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well.' 90 The Ninth Circuit used functional requirements for
achieving compatibility as an example of the kinds of unprotectable
elements in programs that one might need to disassemble object
code in order to discern. ' The Ninth Circuit looked to Baker v.
Selden, among other cases,'9 2 for propositions such as that copyright protection did not extend to functional aspects of protected
works and that the scope of copyright for functional writings was
relatively thin because most of the contents of such works are
functional.'93 The court's concern that Sega's copyright not be
interpreted as giving it a de facto monopoly on the functional
concepts embodied in the program"' also harkens back to themes
first developed in Baker v. Selden and elucidated further in the
Sony decision concerning the potential for overbroad interpretations
of copyright law that would confer patent-like protection.19 5
If a competing developer claimed fair use for decompiling a
program to get access to an innovative unpatented algorithm, the
purpose of the use would be identical to that in Sega: to understand a functional aspect of the program that was unprotectable by

1 It would be unnecessary to decompile a program to get access to a patented algorithm
because information about the algorithm would be available from the patent. Hence, Sega's
requirement that the information not be available except by decompilation or disassembly
could not be satisfied.
191Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d at 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992).
Sega made extensive use of Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc., 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (2nd Cir.), opinion withdrawn and superseded in reh'g by, 982 F.2d
693 (2nd Cir. 1992), on remand, 832 F. Supp. 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), which in turn heavily
relied on Baker v. Selden. See Altai, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1251 (characterizing Baker v.
Selden as "the starting point in [copyright] analyses of utilitarian works"). To characterize

decisions such asAltai and Sega as though they deny "full copyright protection' to programs,
as Miller does, see Miller, supra note 125, at 1009, is to ignore that there is a long history
in copyright law arising from Baker v. Selden that has regarded the functional content of
utilitarian works as beyond the scope of copyright. Miller's article is not the first time he
has ignored this tradition. See Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against
Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 727.49 (1984)
(discussing utilitarian character of computer programs and why it presented problems for

copyright law to rebut CONTU Report's assertion that utility of work had never disqualified
it from copyright protection). Miller was the chair of the CONTU subcommittee responsible
for studying whether computer programs should be protected by copyright law. See also
sources cited supra notes 184-185.
"3 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524. See also sources cited supra note 192.
19 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526.
86

'

See supra notes 44, 59-60 and accompanying text.
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copyright law in order to make a new noninfringing program.l"
The nature of the work would be the same as in Sega, for the work
would be an object-code form of a program containing functional
elements that were unavailable except through decompilation. The
whole program would be copied, but as in Sega, the copy would be
intermediate in nature. The only potential for harm to the market
would be that which flows from the development of a new noninfringing work, a kind of harm that Sega says does not injure
copyright interests.
The real concern of those who oppose decompilation of computer
programs-a concern which the Ninth Circuit detected only
obliquely, if at all, in the Sega case-is that much of the value in
a computer program lies in the applied know-how embodied in
it.1 ' Much of this know-how cannot be discerned by watching
the executable version of the program in operation.'"e As long as
the program is not decompiled, the applied know-how embodied in
it can successfully be claimed as a trade secret. If someone can get

9

One substantial difference in opinion among those who support the Sega decision (see
supra note 128 for a list ofcopyright law professors who urged the court to rule as it did) and
those who are critical of its holding (such as Miller, see supra note 125) arises from their very
different conceptions of the underlying purpose of copyright law. If one conceives of
copyright's purpose as solely being an incentive to the production and commercial
distribution of creative works, then it follows that one would be receptive to arguments that
a competitor's decompilation to get access to any information embodied in the work might
undermine incentives to produce and distribute it. If, however, one considers that the
purpose of copyright is to promote the creation and dissemination of knowledge, it will follow
that one will be more receptive to arguments that if decompilation is necessary in order to
get access to knowledge, it should be noninfringing. Sega is more consistent with the latter
view than the former, as is Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991). See also OTA REPORT, supra note 14; Litman, supra note 77; Patterson, supra note
1; PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 87; Samuelson, Modifying Software, supra note 2 (all
supporting
view that purpose of copyright is to promote learning).
19
See, eg., Reichman, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
19 The principal reason the Ninth Circuit gave for rejecting Accolade's argument that
decompilation should be considered per se lawful in order to get access to unprotectable
elements of copyrighted software was that many of the unprotectable elements of programs
are observable by watching the program in operation, making decompilation unnecessary to
get access to these unprotected elements. "The need to disassemble object code arises, if at
all, only in connection with operations systems, system interface procedures, and other
programs that are not visible to the user when operating--and then only when no alternative
means of gaining an understanding of those ideas and functional concepts exists." Sega, 977
F.2d at 1520. In fact, a great deal of valuable know-how embodied in programs cannot be
discerned by watching programs in operation.
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access to the know-how through decompilation, the know-how can
no longer be claimed as a trade secret for the obvious reason that
it will no longer be a secret (at least as to that person). Nor can it
be regarded as expression for copyright purposes 1 nor as an
invention under patent law.'
The goal of those who have
opposed decompilation has been a prophylactic one, to use copyright
to stop intermediate copying that threatens to destroy the trade
secret status of applied know-how embodied in programs.2°1
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Sega was correct as a matter of
copyright law, for it is no more appropriate for copyright law to be
used to protect against acquisition of information embodied in
mass-marketed copies of copyrighted works than the Ninth Circuit
in Sega thought it was to use copyright as a way to get patent-like
protection for the functional requirements for making a program
compatible with the Sega machine."° The court's response to the
argument that strong protection against decompilation was needed
because of the high cost of software development was that it was
not consistent with the Feist decision in which the Court rejected
the "sweat-of-the-brow" theory of originality. 3 Sega quoted from
Feist for the proposition that copying facts and other unprotectable
elements from copyrighted works is neither unfair nor unfortunate,
but rather is the very means by which the purposes of copyright are

SSee, eg., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879) (T'he very object of publishing a
book on science or useful arts is to communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it
contains. But this object would be frustrated if the knowledge could not be used without
incurring the guilt of piracy of the book.*). See also Feist, 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (regarding
copying of facts as promoting purposes of copyright).
' Generally speaking, applied know-how involves only incremental improvements over
the prior art and will not rise to the necessary level of invention to support a patent. See,
e~g., Reichman, supra note 11, at 682. See also Karjala, supra note 163 (arguing that it is
appropriate to leave incremental know-how in public domain).
20
' See, e.g., Grogan, supra note 171; Miller, supra note 125.
' Sega rightly looks to the Supreme Court's decision in Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft
Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989) for further support for a fair-use privilege for disassembly when
necessary to develop an interoperable program. In their amicus brief to the Ninth Circuit,
eleven copyright law professors characterized the Bonito Boats decision as recogniz[ing] a
competitor's right to reverse engineer unpatented innovation as a fundamental ingredient
of the intellectual property balance and the competitive system it regulates." Law Professor
Amicus Brief, supra note 128, at 158. See also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975
F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
' Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
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advanced.' ° Sega, in other words, is well-grounded in copyright
law and tradition, and its critics are simply wrong about how
copyright law should be applied to computer programs.
B. FAIR USE IN OTHER SOFTWARE CASES

The revival of Baker v. Selden as a precedent with implications
for fair-use defenses when a second comer reproduces functional
elements of copyrightable works may be among the most important
aspects of Sega. All too often Baker v. Selden is cited as though it
had held only that abstract ideas are unprotectable by copyright
law or that when only a small number of ways exist to express a
particular idea, idea and expression will be considered to have
"merged" and, so as not to give protection to the idea, the constrained expression will either not be protected at all or will be
protected only against exact duplication. 2 5 Now that the Ninth
Id.
As Professor Reichman has shown, the idea/expression distinction predated Baker v.
Selden and does not constitute its contribution to American copyright law:
[Tihe historical role of Baker v. Selden was to override the exclusive
reproduction rights in a very particular set of circumstances. These were
cases in which the standard defenses (including idea-expression)
appeared insufficient to guarantee a third party's right to use functional
features embodied in the work because that use seemed to entail an
unauthorized reproduction of the protected work, including its actionable
subject matter.
J.H. Reichman, Computer Programs As Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of
Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639, 693
n.288 (1989). Reichman contends that Baker v. Selden created "a species of fair use devised
for utilitarian works [in order to] facilitate use of the unprotectable utilitarian features." Id.
The Sega decision is in accord with this conception of Baker v. Selden.
This interpretation of Baker v. Selden opens up an alternative way for courts to regard
reproductions of information needed to achieve compatibility as noninfringing conduct. This
information, when embodied in a computer program, may be characterized as a compilation
of information which required creative selection and arrangement, or as a component of the
"structure, sequence, and organization" of the program. On such theories has rested the
argument that interface information is protectable expression. Although one can conceive
of interface information as an instance in which "idea/expression merger" has occurred or as
among the elements of a "process" which are unprotectable under section 102(b), it is also
possible to regard the reproduction of interface information as a fair use. The purpose of the
use would be to create an interoperable but otherwise noninfringing program. The nature
of the work would be a functional writing that cannot interoperate with programs or
machines without reproduction of these elements. Only the portion needed for interoperability would be reproduced. And no harm to the market of a sort contemplated by copyright
"0
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Circuit in Sega has recognized that Baker v. Selden is a case with
important implications for the scope of fair use in cases involving
functional writings, it is possible that fair use will come to be used
in other kinds of software cases as well.
Consistent with the Sony and Sega decisions, a court might also
regard error correction or other reasonable adaptations of software
as noninfringing fair uses of copyrighted software even if the firm
that fixed the software was a licensee of the software rather than
an owner of a copy of the program. 206 Although the special
software provision of the copyright statute confers the right to
make adaptations to software on owners of copies of the software,"7 the fair-use defense is not so limited.'
Fair use is an
"equitable rule of reason" of general application for mediating
between the interests of consumers and of copyright owners as to
uses that can be made of the protected work.2' Courts would
undoubtedly take into account, as part of the fair-use calculus ,211
that the software was licensed, especially if the license contained
a term limiting the user's right to modify the software. If, however,
the licensor was unwilling or unable to provide prompt service for
fixing errors, fair use might well shield the user whose business
depended on use of certain software if that user went ahead and

would occur through reproduction of interface information so long as the program was
otherwise different in expression.
'
See Foresight Resources Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Kan. 1989)
(applying § 117 notwithstanding the fact that Foresight was a licensee of the software).
' The CONTU Commission had recommended that the right to make adaptations should
be given to "rightful possessors" of copies of programs, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 12 (Library of
Congress, 1979) [hereinafter CONTU Report] but as enacted, the right is given only to
owners of copies of programs. For a discussion concerning who, consistent with copyright
policy, should be regarded as an "owner of a copy" of a program for purposes of § 117, see
Rice, supra note 159. Courts may also disregard vendor characterizations of a transaction
by which consumer acquires copyrighted software as a "license" transaction. Id.
2" See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1520-21 (rejecting Sega's argument that § 117, in essence,
supplanted fair use with respect to computer software).
See, eg., Weinreb, supra note 27.
The nature of the distribution arrangement has been considered as part of the second
fair-use factor (concerning nature of the work) in recent Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g.,
Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50 (television broadcast of movies considered as part of nature of
copyrighted work factor); Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
(unpublished status of Ford memoirs was considered as part of second fair-use factor).
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corrected the bug himself. 11
Fair use can also be argued as a basis upon which to shield those
who copy interface specifications from another program to achieve
compatibility.212 In Sega, fair use was used not only to excuse
disassembly copying by Accolade, but also to excuse Accolade's
reproduction of a small segment of code necessary for the interoperation of its game cartridge in the Sega console.2" 3
Relying on Sega and Galoob, Borland International recently
argued that the "key reader" feature of its spreadsheet program
made only a fair use of functional elements of the Lotus 1-2-3 user
interface. 1 4 Borland and Lotus have been in litigation for some
years now, principally over Borland's decision to build an "emulation interface" for its competitive spreadsheet program to enable
those users who had built up a library of macros developed with
Lotus 1-2-3 to continue to make use of their investment in these
macros while at the same time switching to the Borland product.
In order to permit users to make use of their macro libraries, it was
necessary for the Borland emulation interface to reproduce the
Lotus 1-2-3 command hierarchy (which was, however, presented in
a different manner than Lotus' program). Borland argued this
reproduction was excusable principally because the command
hierarchy is a fundamental part of the functionality of Lotus' macro
system.215 Since the copyright statute states that "systems" are
"1" The EC Directive directs member states to permit lawful users of software to do error
correction and forbids contractual restrictions that would purport to deprive users of the
right to do error correction. See EC Directive, supra note 156. Although the decompilation
privilege of the EC Directive is limited to decompilation necessary to obtain interface
information that is unavailable from other sources, one can make a reasonable argument
that any decompilation necessary to do error correction would be privileged as a necessary
incident to the error correction privilege given in Article 5.1 that cannot be contracted away.
21 Altai and Sega indicate that interface information and procedures should be 'filtered
out" of copyright infringement analyses because they are the kinds of elements of programs
that Congress meant to exclude from protection by enactment of section 102(b). But if
Reichman is correct in suggesting that Baker v. Selden created a species of fair use for the
reproduction of functional elements of protected works, see supra note 11, fair use would
simply provide an additional ground for reaching the same result.
21 Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 n.7 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting
Sega's argument that inclusion of this code was not fair use, although also seeming to
suggest that this code was either too functional or too short a sequence to be protectable by
copyright).
214See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 223 (D. Mass. 1993).
"" Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Intl, 740 F. Supp. 37, 65 (D. Mass. 1990).
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not protectable by copyright law, Borland argued that it had not
infringed Lotus' copyright.
After the trial court ruled that the reproduction of the command
hierarchy was an infringement,""6 Borland began marketing a
version of its spreadsheet program that no longer made any visual
presentation of the Lotus commands. But Borland's "key reader"
feature accepted the same keystrokes to perform the same functions
as Lotus 1-2-3, which effectively allowed users to continue to
execute macro sequences constructed in accordance with the Lotus
command hierarchy. Borland's fair-use argument posited that its
purpose in developing the key reader feature was to permit users
to have access to the functionality of Lotus' macro system.217
Borland argued that the nature-of-the-work factor favored its fairuse defense, for the Lotus program was a factual or functional
work. Both factual and functional works are classes of copyrighted
works for which the scope of fair use is generally broader than for
artistic works. Borland argued that it had reproduced only as
much of the Lotus program as was necessary to allow users to have
access to the macro facility. And by developing a new improved
spreadsheet program and wholly original code, Borland had
contributed to the achievement of the underlying purposes of
copyright law in the same manner as Accolade had.
Given Judge Keeton's prior rulings in litigation involving Lotus
1-2-3,218 it was not particularly surprising that he ruled against
Borland's fair-use defense to Lotus' claim of infringement relating
to the key reader feature. The court decided that the purpose of
Borland's use was commercial, which under Sony gave rise to a
presumption of unfairness. 219 The court seems to have regarded
Lotus' command hierarchy as quite expressive because of the many
different ways in which a spreadsheet command hierarchy might

s Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1992).
21? Borland relied on Galoob as recognizing interests of users as an important component
of fair-use balancing. See Borland, 831 F. Supp. at 241.
218 See, eg., Borland,831 F. Supp. at 242; Paperback,740 F. Supp. at 39. For a critique
of Judge Keeton's Paperback decision, see Samuelson, supra note 184. See also Law
Professor Amicus Brief, supra note 128. Like Professor Miller, Judge Keeton seems to have
a blind spot about Baker v. Selden.
29 Borland, 831 F. Supp. at 241.
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be constructed. 220 It characterized what had been copied as a
substantial part of the Lotus program.221 The court also stated
there was clear competitive harm to Lotus' market. 2
The First Circuit Court of Appeals may find fault with Judge
Keeton's analysis of Borland's fair-use defense for its characterization of Borland's purpose as entirely commercial, for its characterization of the nature of the work as quite expressive, and for its
unwillingness to consider user interests in the balancing process,
which is difficult to reconcile with many aspects of the Sega and
Galoob decisions. But the First Circuit may also recognize a
significant inconsistency in the trial court's opinion. Although
rejecting Borland's necessity argument in the fair-use portion of the
opinion, Judge Keeton elsewhere indicated once again how critically
important an aspect of the functionality of the macro system the
command hierarchy is. "To interpret a macro," said the court, "the
program must use the Lotus 1-2-3 menu structure. If a program
did not have a representation of the 1-2-3 menu hierarchy somewhere within the program code (or in a file used by the code), then
there is no way that the program could understand that 'rfc' refers
to a path through the menu tree to the specific executable operation
that changes a cell or cells' appearance to monetary units ....
The First Circuit may be more receptive to applying the principles
of Baker v. Selden to judging Borland's use of the Lotus command
hierarchy. It may also be more willing to give consideration to user
interests in macro compatibility than Judge Keeton has been. 24
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF GALOOB

FOR USES OF ELECTRONIC

INFORMATION TOOLS ON COPYRIGHTED WORKS

Galoob's Game Genie is just one example of the extraordinary
array of electronic information tools now available in the commer-

22 Id. at 243.
ulId.

mId. at 243-44.
Id. at 230.
For a software-user-interface case giving attention to user interests, see, e.g.,

Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D, Tex. 1978).
See supra note 145 and accompanying text regarding Sony's and Galoob's consideration of
user interests.
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cial market that permit users to experiment with the plastic nature
of works in digital form.'
By plasticity, I mean the ease with
which such works can be manipulated, transformed, and/or inserted
into other works.2 6 Although many authors might prefer for
their works to remain as fixed as they have traditionally been in
printed form, the genie of plasticity cannot be pushed back into the
bottle. Digital manipulation is here to stay, for the manipulability
of digital
data is one of the key advantages of the digital medi27
umn.

2

There will unquestionably be many digital manipulations of
copyrighted works that cannot be justified as fair use because
commercial appropriations of their work will pose too severe a
threat to the ability of copyright owners to obtain a fair return.'
If left unchecked, such appropriations could result in market failure
in the production of creative works, the very market failure that
the copyright system aims to avoid.'
But there will just as
surely be some uses of these tools that can be justified as fair use
under the Sony and Galoob decisions, as this section will endeavor
to demonstrate. When developers of electronic information tools
expect the tools to be copied, it should be unnecessary to call upon
fair use to shelter some digital reproductions or manipulations of
copyrighted works. 2 °
As the reader will see, in a time of rapid technological change,
countries such as the United States with fair-use or fair-dealing
provisions in their copyright laws may find it easier to adapt to the
challenges that electronic information tools present for regulation
of uses that can be made of copyrighted materials. It will often be
' See infra notes 231.254 and accompanying text. In the software industry, these kinds
of programs are regarded as "tools." See Reichman, ElectronicInformationTools, supra note

19 (for a discussion of the intellectual property implications of the "tool" metaphor).
In another essay, I identified the plasticity of works in digital form as one of six
characteristics that pose challenges for existing intellectual property regimes. See Pamela
Samuelson, DigitalMedia and The ChangingFace ofIntellectual PropertyLaw, 16 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 323 (1990).
Digital manipulations can raise more legal problems than copyright infringements.
See Tomlinson, infra note 228.
' See examples cited in Don E. Tomlinson, Computer Manipulation and Creation of
Images and Sounds: Assessing the Impact (Annenberg Washington Program/Comm. Pol'y

Stud., Northwestern Univ., Evanston, IL), 1993.
23 See Gordon, supra note 9, at 1435-69.
See infra notes 231-233 and accompanying text.
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in the public interest for electronic information tools to be available
in the marketplace and to be used in ways that do not undermine
incentives to engage in creative activity.
A. TOOLS FOR EXPANDING ORDINARY USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS

"Clip art" and "clip sound" programs are one class of electronic
information tools widely available on the market today that
explicitly envision the copying of their components as an ordinary
use by consumers.2 1 Developers of copyrighted clip-art programs
know that consumers expect to use the programs to make copies of
the images or sounds contained in the program's compilation. It is,
in fact, to fill consumer demand for such a product that they were
developed in the first place. A student might, for instance, clip an
image of the Liberty Bell from the program for use in a school
report. An adult might clip a picture of someone blowing a trumpet
to make an announcement for a slide presentation to clients of her
employer.
Consumers who make ordinary use of such programs for their
intended purposes would not, in my judgment, even have to look to
fair use to justify clipping out a reasonable number of images or
sounds for their own purposes. 2 But fair use would surely
shield such uses if the issue was ever litigated. What clip-art
program developers are concerned about is someone reproducing its
clip-art images and putting them into a competing clip-art program.2

Somewhat more troublesome from a copyright standpoint,
however, is the wide array of software tools that can be used by
consumers to do such things as "morph" images from one shape to

28

Clickart produces a variety of clip-art products for different classes of uses (business,

sports, holiday, etc.).
' See Stern, supra note 104, at 107 (suggesting use of an implied license theory for

consumer digital manipulations).
=3 See, eg., Patricia J. Pane, CSC CountersuesSPC Over Clip Art; CSC Claims Copyright
Infringements by Harvard GraphicsPrograms,INFOwORLD, June 18, 1990, at 8 (discussing
CSC's countersuit to enjoin SPC from selling three Harvard Graphics products which CSC
alleged contained symbols that are substantially similar to symbols created by CSC).
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another,' change the texture of an image (making it plaid
instead of plain white or making a photograph look like a painting
by Van Gogh),' m or digitally excise the head from a person in a
photograph and move it onto the head of another figure in the same
or a different photograph.'m All of these "tools" can, of course, be
used to infringe copyrights.
Had Universal won its lawsuit against Sony, an argument could
have been made that sale of these digital manipulation tools should
be enjoined on the theory that the tools' developer should be
assumed to have constructive notice that some consumers would
use the tools to infringe copyrights." 7 Because these tools are
capable of substantial noninfringing uses, the Sony decision would
seem to shield their developers from any concern that contributory
infringement charges may be brought against them merely because
some people may use them to infringe copyrights.
It is, of course, a separate question whether consumers who use
these tools to morph images scanned in from a magazine are
infringers of a copyright in the photograph. Sony and Galoob
would seem to affirm that private noncommercial uses of this sort
should be presumed to be noninfringing under the fair-use doctrine.

' Gryphon Software's "Morph" product is an example of this. I have seen the product
of another electronic information tool that can be used to alter text so that it conforms to a
particular dialect of speech (DOD-speak, for example, or Southern lingo).
" Xaos Tools' "Pandemonium* product can be used for texture alterations.
mAdobe's "Photoshop" is one of many products that can be used for this purpose. This
technique was recently demonstrated in the movie "Rising Sun* to show a police officer that
photographs and videotape can no longer be completely trusted as evidence because of the
ease with which digital manipulations can be made of them. See also Tomlinson, supra note
228 (assessing impact of manipulation of digital images and sounds).
In the aftermath of Sony, it became apparent that copyright owners would not be able
to use copyright law to control distribution ofother reproductive technologies, such as digital
audio tape (DAT) recording machines, because they could be used to make unauthorized
copies of sound recordings. DAT machines were particularly threatening to the recording
industry because, in undoctored form, they can be used to make perfect copies instead of
degraded-quality copies characteristic of other tape-recording devices. A lengthy legislative
battle ensued in which the recording industry fought for a variety of technical restrictions
on the copying that DAT machines could do. The ultimate outcome of this controversy was
to permit DAT machines to be sold but only if they contained a mechanism that prevents
perfect copies from being made from the first digital copy made with the aid of the DAT
machine. For a discussion of this history, see, e.g., Michael Plumleigh, Comment, Digital
Audio Tape: New Fuel Stokes The Smoldering Home TapingFire,37 UCLA L. REV. 733, 76167 (1990).
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As long as the consumer confined his or her use of the morphed
image to private noncommercial uses, the potential for harm to the
market would not be sufficiently strong to overcome this presumption. One might also look to Patterson's framework for regulating
uses of copyrighted works and conceive of these tools as expanding
the range of ordinary uses consumers can make of their copies of
copyrighted works. As long as consumers do not start making use
of the copyright, setting themselves up as alternative publishers of
the work, copyright interests should not be implicated.
Another class of software tools that are expected to have a
commercially significant future are those that permit a user to
"filter" information of interest (or not of interest) to him or her.2
One use of these systems would be to permit individual customizations of digital information services or products. Through use of a
filtering system which the user had "trained" to understand his or
her interests, one might, for example, produce a customized version
of an electronic newspaper that would weed out sports coverage for
those who, for instance, are not interested in sports.239
An individual consumer who used such tools to tailor an electronic information product or service for his or her own uses would not
need fair use, in Patterson's view, to shield him or her from an
infringement claim by the publisher of an electronic information
product who wanted to offer its own customization tools to its
customers because the tool would merely extend ordinary uses
that
240
could be made of a copy of the work by a purchaser of it.

Although electronic filtering may present a closer question than
some of the other examples presented above, the Sony approach
would at least permit a balancing of interests. Under Galoob, a

m A recent issue of a widely read computing professionals' magazine, COMMUNICATIONS
OF THE ACM, was devoted to information filtering technologies. See articles in 35 COMMS.
ACM 26-84 (December 1992).
' See, eg., Paul Saffo, The Electronic FutureIs Upon Us, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1992, at
B13.
' When information filters allow consumers to tailor what they receive from a publisher,
it becomes more difficult to determine what a "work of authorship" is for copyright purposes,
for there may no longer be one work that the consuming public will experience. For an
excellent discussion of the impact that print technologies had on the social production of
knowledge and information products arising from the fact that everyone who got a copy of
a book saw the same thing, see ELIZABETH EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT
OF CHANGE (1979).
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court might decide not to intervene as long as the user was still
paying the standard subscription fee to the publisher of the
newspaper. 2"
This would undercut the argument that there
would be any demonstrable harm to the market for the copyrighted
work being filtered. Harm to the market for the publisher's own
filtering software would be akin to arguing that sale of the Game
Genie was unfair because it had harmed Nintendo's opportunity to
market a Game Genie-like product. This was a potential market
that the Ninth Circuit seemed to be unwilling to reserve exclusively
for Nintendo. The focus of the fair-use inquiry should be on the
harm to the market for the copyrighted work, not on its potential
impact on the sale of peripheral devices or software capable of
interacting with the copyrighted work.
Among the other extensions of ordinary uses of copies of copyrighted works that can be expected to arise from digital technology
are these: scanning correspondence, reports, and other documents
received by a firm or a person into an electronic repository for
storage and/or distribution to appropriate personnel, 242 reformatting electronic documents so that they can be read on a different
computer or by different software than that on which they were

24

1 Publishers can be expected to be particularly concerned about the potential harms to
their market if users are permitted to construct filters that omit all advertisements from the
electronic material, for although ads in print newspapers can be ignored by readers, ads
cannot be systematically omitted from the version delivered to the consumer's front porch
every morning. The San Jose Mercury News is among the newspapers which have begun
to experiment with electronic delivery of their information products.
'K This is not significantly different from the routine copying of correspondence and other
documents received by businesses for purposes such as informing the appropriate personnel
in sales, marketing, and support divisions of the firm about its contents, or within a law
firm, for purposes of keeping the senior and junior partners and the team of associates
informed of some development pertaining to a case. This discussion does not address the
question of whether it would be lawful to make copies, by scanning or photocopying, of the
whole or parts of print magazines or journals whose publishers are known to be sensitive to
reproductions of their works. See, e.g., American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F.
Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that company's unauthorized photocopying of copyrighted
articles was not fair use). Discussion here is focused on the routine copying of texts that no
one but a copyright lawyer would ever even think to regard as potential infringements, but
which arguably are now that copyright attaches automatically by operation of law to every
original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. For an insightful
discussion about the gap that exists between the general public's notions of copyright and
that which underlies the law today, see Jessica Litman, Copyright As Myth, 53 U. PITT. L.
REV. 235 (1991).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1993

59

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 6

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 1:49

created,' electronic tagging of components of documents so that
they can be retrieved in an electronic database based on other
2
attributes than the presence of particular words in the text, "
and automatic translations of documents when the technology
evolves to permit this.'
Although the likelihood of litigation over these kinds of ordinary
uses of texts is low, it is important for copyright lawyers to be
aware that digital technologies provide opportunities for new kinds
of uses to be made of works of authorship to which copyright
automatically attaches. The Galoob and Sony decisions support the
view that neither the tools that extend the uses consumers can
make of their copies of works of authorship nor private uses that
may be made of them with these tools ought generally to be
regarded as raising serious copyright concerns. Copyright law will
have ample work to do in regulating efforts to engage in competitive publication activities.'
Is Many software tools exist for doing reformatting of this sort. Software Bridge is one
such product.
' Most of the electronic databases with which the public is familiar rely on matching of
bit sequences for particular words as the primary search mechanism. While this search
technique is very useful, it is not the only form of electronic search that some users might
want to do. Increasingly, firms are processing documents so that the logical structure of the
document can be "tagged" in a way that permits searches in terms of tagged elements or
their attribute values. See, e.g., Haviland Wright, SGML Frees Information, BYTE, June
1992, at 279.
1 Natural language processing has turned out to be more difficult than many earlier
enthusiasts had hoped, but millions of dollars continue to be spent to improve natural
language translation techniques. Leaving aside the question of whether an automatic
translation of books or journals is infringement, I wish to address the question of whether
ordinary correspondence or other documents people or firms routinely receive can be
translated for ordinary uses. If, for example, I received a letter in Japanese and asked a
friend to translate it into English so that I can know what the letter says, I believe I would
be making an ordinary and noninfringing use of my copy of the letter to have it translated.
' It is a common practice for habitues of the Internet to make private noncommercial
copies of electronic texts by, for example, forwarding copies of messages (an activity which
involves making a copy of the text), sending clips from articles to friends, and posting things
on electronic bulletin boards or at sites on the net where others can get copies via
anonymous file transfer protocols. Private noncommercial copying is generally considered
by the community of Internet users to be acceptable behavior, and under Sony, this practice
would seem to be fair use. See generally Anne W. Branscomb, Common Law For the
Electronic Frontier: Computers, Networks, and Public Policy, SCI. AM., Sept. 1991 at 154.
But when the sysop (system operator) of a commercial bbs (electronic bulletin board system)
permits or encourages postings of copyrighted materials, such as photographs from Playboy
magazine, for the consumption of bbs users, he or she invites copyright infringement actions.
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B. TOOLS FOR AIDING THE INTERPRETATION OF OTHER WORKS

Other kinds of software tools permit users to transform digital
data from one class of work to another. 7 7 Because the electronic
signals constituting a work in digital form do not know (until the
computer and software processing them interprets them) whether
they are parts of a song, a picture, a text, a program, or a motion
picture, they can, in fact, be more than one kind of work.'
Some
transformations of digital data made with the aid of such tools are
useful for aiding interpretation of the data.2" 9

See, eg., Michael Sokolove, Personal Computers Get PersonalHigh-Tech Erotica Network
Offers Laptop Intimacy, In-Home Privacy, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 21, 1993, at Al.
' In a previous article, I have discussed how copyright law might deal with computergenerated works. See Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights, supra note 108. It is worth
pointing out that computer-generated works are an example of one class of work (namely a
program) being digitally processed to produce a second class of work (a song or a picture, for
example). As challenging as computer-generated works are when the work generated is a
class of work that is protectable by copyright law as long as the originality requirement is
met, it is more difficult when the work generated by the program is not copyrightable (the
chip produced by a silicon compiler). A relatively new set of techniques, known as
stereolithography, permit computer-aided design of machines, machine parts, and/or tools.
It begins with computer graphics models of these items. Simulations can then be done to
test their performance. Adjustments to the design can then be made to improve performance, and another simulation done of the adjusted design. Once the model achieves a
satisfactory performance in the simulation, the computer can then generate the mold or
machine tooling necessary to produce actual instances of the machine, machine part, or tool.
This technique reduces significantly the research and development costs involved in
manufacturing machine parts. See Real Virtuality: StereoLithography-RapidPrototyping
in 3-D, PROCEEDINGS Op ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER HUMAN INTERACTION, 1990, at 377-78

[hereinafter SIGGRAPH PROCEEDINGS]. See also Reichman, Electronic Information Tools,
supra note 19, at 830-38.
' A friend of mine once built a laser system that would accept as input signals generated
when a sound recording was being played. It would process these data to emit as output
patterns of light that could be dynamically displayed on a white wall. Was the pattern of
light a derivative work of the copyrighted sound recording? This question is of more than
academic interest. A company called 3DO will be releasing a multimedia product this fall
which, among other things, produces visual displays of sound recordings. Galoob may make
it safe for 3DO to market this particular feature.
' An example of digital transformations that can be done with an electronic copy of a
work in order to aid its interpretation is demonstrated in the movie "Rising Sun." In that
movie, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) authorize someone to make copies of a
Japanese company's security videotape in order to try to reconstruct the contents of the
original tape on which a murder was recorded. (The original tape had been doctored to edit
out the murder and the identity of the murderer.) Perhaps no one but a copyright lawyer
would ever have thought of suggesting that if this had been a real case, the LAPD might
have to worry about copyright liability for this kind of investigative activity. But they were,
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Some examples will illustrate this unique characteristic of the
digital medium and how tools can exploit this unique characteristic.
At a conference on computer-human interaction a few years ago, I
saw a demonstration of a software tool that permitted users to
process digital signals representing visual materials to produce
sounds that would aid in the interpretation of the visual materials.'
The first of the two demonstrations given of this tool
involved a digitized image of a photograph of a tissue sample which
was to be examined in order to detect the presence of cancerous
cells. With the aid of the software tool, someone seeking to
interpret this image could pass the cursor over different parts of
the sample. This caused the tool to process the visual data as
sounds. Muscle tissue not only looked different from nerve tissue;
it "sounded" different as well. Because it was difficult to detect
cancerous cells relying solely on visual cues, it helped to have a
second source of information (i.e., the sounds) with which to try to
distinguish the "good cells" from the "bad ones."
A second demonstration of this tool aided the interpretation of a
digitized image of a chart. The chart depicted the distribution of
men and women in the sciences in terms of their professional rank
and salaries. By assigning a deep bass sound to the visual symbol
representing males and a high piccolo sound to the visual symbol
representing females and then running the cursor over different
parts of a digitized image of the chart, one could "hear" (as well as
see) how few women had either high ranks or high salaries in the
field of science.
Perhaps no one would think to claim copyright in a digitized
image of a tissue sample, but someone might very well claim a
copyright in the chart. Under Patterson's approach, one could
regard use of this tool to interpret the data as an ordinary use of
a copy of the work by a consumer. But even if a copyright claimant

after all, making copies of an arguably original audiovisual work in order to prepare a
derivative work of a derivative work which they intended to be a recreation of the original
work. For none of these intermediate or the final reconstructed copy had they gotten the
company's permission, and indeed, had they asked for permission, it would likely have been
denied.
M For a paper discussing this system, see Stuart Smith, R. Daniel Bergeron & Georges
G. Grinstein, Stereophonic and Surface Sound Generation For Exploratory Data Analysis,
SIGGRAPH PROCEEDINGS, 1990, at 125.
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of either work expressed an objection to use of the tool, either as
the creation of an unauthorized derivative work or as the reproduction of portions of the work in a different medium, I would argue
that no infringement of copyright could be found. Under the
regulatory framework of the Sony and Galoob decisions, use of the
interpretation tool would be a noninfringing fair use, for it would
involve a noncommercial research purpose, the nature of the work
would be factual, which generally favors fair use, and little or no
harm to the market for the work would be likely to arise from the
use.
Among the other software tools now available to aid in the
interpretation of data are those that allow users to "visualize"
scientific data. 1 Scientific data are typically collected and
represented in textual form, often as a set of numbers corresponding to various data types being collected. One of the most difficult
tasks of scientific work tends to lie in conceptualizing a way to
represent the data to make it more comprehensible. Scientific
visualization tools allow researchers to assign certain shapes and/or
colors to certain classes of data. The data are then processed with
the aid of the tool to produce visual representations with the
assigned attributes. Often, such tools will be used by the person
who collected the data and who may claim a copyright in the
scientific data compilation by virtue of his or her exercise of
judgment in the selection or arrangement of data in the compilation, and of course, no copyright concerns are likely to arise from
this use.
Scientific visualization tools can, however, be used by someone
other than the original data gatherer. They may also be used to
create an alternative visualization, including one that might
challenge the interpretation given to them by the data gatherer.
As with the previous example, I believe that someone who used
such a software tool to make a scientific visualization of the data
to aid his or her own interpretation would be making noninfringing

"' See, eg., Brian Cabral, Imaging Vector Fields Using Line Integral Convolution,
SIGGRAPH PROCEEDINGS, 1993, at 263. See also descriptions of panel sessions at SIGGRAPH '93 on Visualization of EnvironmentalData Sets, id. at 385; How To Lie and Confuse
With Visualization, id. at 387.
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uses of the data compilation. 2 Principles of fair use could, if
necessary, also be used to justify the publication of an article with
the challenger's visualization of the data' even if the gatherer
of the data or a publisher of the data compilation or an article
containing a different visualization might object. 254
C. WORKS THAT INTERACT WITH PREEXISTING WORKS

Galoob involved an electronic information tool capable of
interacting with other copyrighted works without appropriating any
expression from them. The Ninth Circuit's willingness to regard
Galoob's product as noninfringing notwithstanding its dependence
on another developer's copyrighted works may have important
implications for the legality of a wide range of "add-on" software
products, as well as for those who prepare navigational paths
through labyrinths of digital texts.
Imagine for a moment that West Publishing Company began
commercially distributing a CDROM disk containing all (or
virtually all) of the federal copyright decisions from its printed
Imagine that West also offered for sale on a separate
volumes.'
disk an electronic casebook, which consisted largely of a set of links

' Any copy of the data compilation made during the processing of the data by means of
the visualization software would be an intermediate copy of a sort similar to that made in
Sega, and a necessary step in doing the visualization. As to the question whether the
visualization would be a derivative work of a data compilation that satisfied the originality
requirement, this raises some of the same quandaries as occurred in Galoob. One could
argue that since Feist tells us that facts are not protectable by copyright, the visualization
is a noninfringing different expression of the data, rather than as a reproduction or
derivative work of the data compilation.
"' The previous note has presented the argument that the visualization should not be
considered an unauthorized derivative work. Even if it was, principles of fair use would
apply, for the use would be for noncommercial research purposes, the nature of the work
would be factual, for which the scope of fair use is generally broad, and little or no harm to
a commercial market would exist. Still, once the data visualization is published, it goes from
the realm of ordinary use to the realm of competitive fair use.
I' One competitive use of digital material that has generated a fair amount of
controversy has been digital sampling of sound recordings. See, eg., Sheila Rule, Record
Companies Are Challenging'Sampling' in Rap, N.Y. TIMES, April 4, 1992, at B1. See also
Molly McGraw, Sound Sampling Protection and Infringement in Today's Music Industry, 4
HIGH TECH. L.J. 147 (1989).

' The Michie Company has recently begun advertising a CDROM of Pennsylvania court
decisions, available in PENNSYLVANIA LAW ON DISC (Michie).
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to portions of the CDROM, as well as some additional commentary,
that had been prepared by a copyright professor under contract to
West. Now suppose that another copyright professor wanted to
prepare an electronic casebook that would interoperate with the
West CDROM case compilation. Galoob may help to answer the
question whether the second casebook author would have to get
West's permission to prepare a competing casebook.
This hypothetical is a specific example of a more generic question
from the field of hypertext.'
When texts are in digital form, it
becomes possible, with the aid of hypertext system software, for
users of the texts to create links between one portion of a text and
another, between one document and another, or among many
documents and portions thereof.2 7 A set of links made by a user
of digital texts can exist as a separate document in a hypertext
publishing system. The link document (often described as a web)
will consist of a compilation of data identifying the starting and
ending points or regions of the material being linked to.'
Depending on how the hypertext system is designed, it may be
possible for other people besides the link author to follow the link
path set forth in the link document. 25 When the link document

See Pamela Samuelson, Some New Kinds ofAuthorship Made PossibleBy Computers
and Some IntellectualPropertyQuestionsIt Raises, 53 U. PrIT. L. REv. 685 (1992) (discussing

experimentation in hypertext and copyright issues it raises, and principles underlying
hypertext, and how electronic text limitations led to hypertext); Pamela Samuelson & Robert
J. Glushko, IntellectualPropertyRights in DigitalLibraryand Hypertext PublishingSystems,
6 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 237 (1993) (examining how intellectual property rights such as
copyright might be dealt with in conjunction with hypertext publishing system and how

these intellectual property rights can be dealt with to make hypertext and digital libraries
viable).
27 See generally PROCEEDINGS OF ACM CONFERENCE ON HYPERTEXT (1987).
' This resembles a print article consisting of a set of suggestions that its readers should

start at the first paragraph on page 50 of a particular book or article and read until the last
paragraph on page 56, then go to another book or article and read from the top of page 17

to the end of chapter 2, etc. What is different about the hypertext link document is that a
user, in contrast to the reader of the print article, can follow the links automatically rather

than having to do the extra work of getting the books and articles and reading them as
designated.

Also, the link-document author may want compensation for anyone who

traverses his or her links, whereas the print bibliographer has no such expectations.
One of the interesting things about hypertexts is that users of them can move beyond
the passive roles they have had as readers of printed texts to become authors themselves
through the construction of links. See generally THEODOR H. NELSON, LITERARY MACHINES
(1993).
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is processed by the hypertext system program, a user who follows
the links created by someone else will see the portions of the documents which the link author has designated.
Hypertext linking poses very similar intellectual property rights
questions to the ones presented in Galoob. Does the author of a
link document infringe copyrights in the works to which links have
been created in violation of exclusive rights that copyright law
gives to authors to prepare derivative works?2" Does a user of
someone else's links infringe any copyright interest of the link
author?"1 Authors of hypertext links would, of course, like to be
free from claims of infringement for linking portions of other
authors' documents yet be able to assert copyright control over
traversals of their links by other users.
As was true with Galoob's Game Genie, the link document would
contain no expression taken from the texts of the authors being
linked to. Because of this, a court deciding whether a link author
had infringed the derivative work rights of authors of the documents to which he had linked would likely doubt that a derivative
work had been created under the rationale given by the Ninth
Circuit in Galoob. 22

' More than two decades ago, copyright scholars noted the dangerous potential for very
broad interpretations of the derivative-work right arising from new technologies. See Panel
Discussion among Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Benjamin Kaplan, Dan Lacy, and Caryl Haskins,
PropertyRights Under the New Technology, reprintedin COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 189, 205, 210 (Martin Greenberger ed., 1971). See also Ralph S.
Brown, Jr., The Widening Gyre: Are Derivative Works Getting Out of Hand?, 3 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1984) (expressing concern over expansive interpretations of "derivative
works"). Galoob was a case in which derivative work rights could have been dramatically
expanded, but the Ninth Circuit chose not to do so.
2' The tricky question here is which of the exclusive rights set forth in § 106 would be
violated by a user who traverses the links that a previous user had constructed. It is worth
noting that the reader of a printed article who followed the research path set forth in it
would not infringe any copyright interest of the article's author because use of the article
would not involve reproduction of it.
2 Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of Am., 964 F.2d 965, 967-69 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582 (1993). See supra note 108 and accompanying text. One might
consider a link document as a "supplementary work," rather than as a derivative work. As
Professor Kaplan has noted, Congress has rejected the extraordinary suggestion made by
some groups that copyright law grant owners of copyrights an exclusive right to prepare
supplementary works. See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 100 n.61
(1967).
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As in Galoob, the court might go on to analyze whether, even
assuming a derivative work was created, a fair use might have
been made of the copyright in the underlying documents. Often the
link author will have an educational or research purpose in
constructing links among documents. Works being linked to would
often be factual in nature, and little from the pre-existing works
would have been appropriated.2' An important factor in a fairuse assessment would likely be that little, if any, harm could be
expected to the market for the works being linked to since the link
document would only be usable if the user has access to the
underlying documents, access for which the user is likely to have
already paid. The Ninth Circuit favored fair use in Galoob in part
because the Game Genie could be used only in conjunction with
Nintendo games for which consumers had already paid.2 '"
The user of the link document might be regarded as making an
ordinary use of the link document by following its trail from one
document to another. Faced with a demand of a link author who
wanted compensation for use of his links, the link user might
analogize her navigation of the links to the print reader's following
of a bibliographic path set forth in a copyrighted article which
would, of course, not be infringing, for it would involve use of the
knowledge in the article, not a reproduction of it.
Within the regulatory framework of fair use, the link user might
argue that her use was private and noncommercial, and may even
have been for a research purpose. The link document would be a
factual compilation which generally enjoys a narrow scope of
copyright protection. However, the whole of the link document
would have been copied, for it must be copied in order to be used.
The link author would also argue that harm to his market would
be evident, for if there is any market for link documents, it will be
that provided by users who can be charged for the value to them of
saving time by following someone else's path rather than going to
the trouble of independently constructing their own link path
through digital texts. Fair use, in this example, as in others
' That is, the link document would contain information about the starting and ending
points from the document to be visited.
*' See also New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, 434 F. Supp. 217 (D.N.J.
1977) (preparing index to aid use of New York Times' annual index was fair use in part
because it did not supplant use of the Times' indices).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1993

67

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 6

116

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 1:49

discussed in this section, at least provides a framework for
balancing the interests of authors and users of digital information
tools.
VII. CONCLUSION

When enacting the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress expressed an
expectation that the fair-use doctrine would-and should--evolve
to deal with challenging questions concerning the application of
copyright law posed by new technologies. 2 This expectation has
been borne out on numerous occasions in the past decade, including, notably, Sony. The strict property-rights view of copyright for
which Universal argued in Sony was rejected by the Court, which
instead seemed to view copyright law as more of a regulatory
regime aimed at achieving a balance among the interests of
copyright owners, the consuming public and other commercial
participants in the marketplace, such that the rights granted to
authors under the statute should be construed as reaching no
further than Congress has intended to achieve this balance.
Importantly, the Supreme Court in Sony saw the case as one in
which application of copyright law had been rendered uncertain
because of a new technology. In such situations, the Court thought
the dispute should be resolved by considering, among other things,
what result will best promote fulfillment of the ultimate purposes
of copyright law. By presuming that private noncommercial uses
of copyrighted works are fair uses and requiring evidence of some
meaningful likelihood of harm to overcome this presumption, Sony
set an important precedent that has implications for many uses of
software and digital texts.
The Ninth Circuit's Galoob and Sega decisions follow in Sony's
footsteps. In Galoob, users' interests in having access to and the
ability to use a device that enhanced their enjoyment of videogames
were given substantial weight. Because users of Galoob's device
had already paid Nintendo for the games with which the device
could be used, and because the device could only be used in
connection with Nintendo games, there was insufficient counterbal-

See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing purpose and provisions of fair
use in Copyright Act).
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ancing evidence of a potential for harm to Nintendo's market so as
to overcome Sony's presumption that private noncommercial uses
of the device were fair and noninfringing. In Sega, a competitor's
need to make intermediate copies of Sega programs in order to gain
access to unprotectable information so it could develop its own
original noninfringing games for use in Sega's machines was
recognized as an important factor favoring fair use. Even though
the intermediate copier's programs competed with Sega's in the
marketplace, the court perceived no harm of concern to copyright
law arising from that use.
Sega would seem to have important implications for many
situations in which competitors in the software industry might find
it necessary to make intermediate copies of another firm's software
in order to gain access to other kinds of unprotected functional
elements of the program. As long as these competitors, like
Accolade, construct their own independently developed, new
noninfringing programs, their uses should also be privileged under
Sega. But Sega would seem to have implications for other kinds of
uses of computer programs, and even for the appropriation of
valuable functional elements of programs.
Galoob would seem to have implications for judging the fairness
of many kinds of private noncommercial uses of programs and
digital texts. This Article has presented numerous examples of
electronic information tools that enhance or extend the ordinary
uses consumers can make of their copies of copyrighted works. As
long as such ordinary uses do not undermine the ability of copyright owners to obtain a fair return for their works, they should
generally not trigger copyright liability. In these and other
circumstances, the fair-use defense provides a flexible and adaptable mechanism with which to balance the interests of copyright
owners, their competitors or would-be competitors, and the public
when conflicts among their interests arise. As Professor Chafee
said some years ago:
The protection given the copyright owner should not
stifle independent creation by others. Nobody else
should be able to market the work, but we refuse to
say nobody else should use it. The world goes ahead
because each of us builds on the work of our prede-
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cessors.... Progress would be stifled if the author
had a complete monopoly of everything in his book
for... [a] long period. Some use of its contents must
be permitted in connection with the independent
creation of other authors. The very policy which
leads the law to encourage his creativeness also
justifies it in facilitating the creativeness of oth2
ers. W
Copyright law will have ample work to do in an age of advanced
technologies in regulating the kinds of commercial iterative copying
with which it is familiar.

2
" Zachariah Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 511
(1945) (emphasis in the original deleted). See also Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39
EMORY L.J. 965 (1990) (arguing for greater public domain of raw materials within copyright

settings).
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